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OF RICHARD EPSTEIN AND OTHER
RADICAL FEMINISTS
MARY ANNE CASE*
My goal in this discussion is to persuade all members of the
Federalist Society that they are or should be feminists. I shall pur-
sue this goal in two ways: first by setting forth an expansive defini-
tion of feminist jurisprudence; secondly by showing that anyone
who combines the two commitments Richard Epstein urges on
feminists-commitments to the descriptive message of sociobi-
ology and to the normative message of libertarianism-must in-
evitably be, not merely a feminist, but a very radical feminist
indeed. In short, feminism is for everyone, especially for Richard
Epstein.
I. WHAT IS FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE?
I have often been asked to define feminist jurisprudence and
have tended in looking for definitions to begin with a dictionary.
I shall do that here as well. Let me begin with the less controver-
sial of the two words: etymologically, "jurisprudence" comes from
two latin words: 'juris", that is "of law", and "prudentia". "Pruden-
tia" is not high theory; it is theory concerned with the concrete
situation, the practical problem. Thus, I prefer the term "femi-
nist jurisprudence" to "feminist legal theory" because we need
both theory and concrete application.' Feministjurisprudence is
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Vhginia School of Law. This article brings
together three specialized fields of inquiry- sociobiology, libertarianism and radical femi-
nism - for each of which I have had invaluable assistance from experts. The sociobiologi-
cal portions of the article are in large part a gain from trade with evolutionary biologist
Todd Preuss, trade between the disciplines more importantly than between the sexes. I
am also grateful to Bill Rodgers, Margaret Gruter and the Grater Institute for Law and
Behavioral Research for first giving me the occasion to think seriously about the connec-
tions between sociobiology and feminism, to Bob Dewar for anthropological expertise
and toJohn Monahan for help with literature on violence. Lillian BeVier andJohn Harri-
son provided an insider's perspective on the Federalists and libertarianism; Mary Becker,
Martha Fineman and Linda McClain help with feminist theory; Eileen Boris historical
references; Barbara Armacost, Clay Gillette,Jack Goldsmith, Pam Karlan,Jody Kraus, Cliff
Landesman, Saul Levmore, Julia and Paul Mahoney, Richard McAdams, Dan Ortiz, Julie
Roin, Paul Stephan, Bill Stuntz, Peter Swire, Jim Whitman, and Jonathan Vogel brain-
storming aid and comments on drafts; Kent Olson reference help; Susan Simches secreta-
rial support; and Julia Mc Donough, Emmy Paulette and Stacey Shawn research
assistance. I am indebted to them all.
1. This emphasis on the particular over the abstract is important to feminism, which
has emphasized its origins in the concrete experiences of women. See, e.g., MARTHA A.
FiNEMAN & NANCY S. THOMASDEN, AT THE BouNDARES OF THE LAW: FMIsmSM AND LEGAL
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a heavily normative area of the law. It asks what, from a feminist
perspective, is wrong with the world; how much does the law
have to do with creating, reinforcing and maintaining what is
wrong; what would the ideal world look like; and how can law
help us to get to that ideal. But, what is feminism? Feminism is an
extremely controverted term. On the one hand, there are those
who say "I am not a feminist but.. .," and then proceed to de-
scribe most of the commitments central to any feminist agenda.
On the other hand, there are those who say, "I am a feminist but
you are not." If, however, you look in the dictionary for a defini-
tion of feminism, you generally come to a fairly inclusive one and
it is this inclusive definition of feminism that I hope all will come
to accept. Dictionary definitions generally talk about a commit-
ment to the equality of the sexes, a commitment to women's
rights and the removal of restrictions that discriminate against
them.2 I hope that there are few who, using this terminology,
would not be feminists.8 That, of course, does not answer the
question what it means to have equality of the sexes,4 what it
means to have women's rights. This is why feministjurisprudence
remains a topic worth talking about and one about which a lot of
people have a lot of contradictory things to say.
I myself think it is important to remember that feminism is not
simply about women.5 Feminism is about the sexes-there are
THEORY xii-xiii (1991) (stressing need for "middle-range theory" that "mediates between
the material circumstances of women's lives and the grand realizations that law is
gendered .... is a manifestation of power ... and works to the detriment of women," a
theory that "connects the empirical with the abstract so that both are enriched.").
2. See, ag., WEBSTr's NEW THaw INTERN'munoNAL DIarnoNARY (16th ed. 1971) (defining
"feminism" as "a: the theory of the political, economic and social equality of the sexes b:
organized activity on behalf of women's rights and interests; specif. the 19th and 20th
century movement seeking to remove restrictions that discriminate against women.").
3. Or at least, to the extent that they are not active advocates, be sympathetic to
feminism.
4. I should note that Martha Fimeman insisted in response to my comments at the
Symposium that she "oppose[d] equality and do[es] not think it should be a goal of
feminism." Se, e.g., MARTHA A. FnEmAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALrTY THE RHETORiC AND
REAL=rY OF DIVORCE REFoRM 20-22 (1991) (arguing that equality has limitations because it
is a concept with a legal history that cannot be entirely reshaped for feminist ends, and to
the extent it is limited to rule-equality or sameness of treatment, rather than equality of
results, it poorly serves the needs of women).
5. Thus I disagree with moderator Gary Lawson, whose definitions focus exclusively on
women. See Gary Lawson, Feminist Legal Theories, HAiv.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 325 (1995) (ac-
cording to Lawson, feminism may be the "study of the relationship between women and
the law," " 'concern'... for improvement in the status of women," etc.). Not all feminist
legal theorists would agree with me. See, e.g., Christine Littleton, Does it Still Make Sense to
Talk About "Women"?, 1 UCLA WomEN'S L.j. 15, 33 n.84 (1991) ("In this Article I make a
claim that I have only recently begun to understand as controversial: feminism is about
women.... A feminist taking this perspective ... would not.., be required or even
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two of them.6 I think we have to focus on how men as well as
women fit into the world, because up to now the focus on women
has left men in a sense far less free than women.' It has also, as
critics of liberal feminism have observed, placed too much em-
phasis on fitting women into the slots left in a world shaped
around a male standard. Women themselves will not be com-
pletely free unless the feminist focus shifts from women's rights
alone to the relations between men and women, to the equality
of each in relation to the other and the realization of the free-
dom of each under law and in the world. But this inclusive defini-
tion covers no particular ideology-no particular ideology, that
is, about things other than a general commitment to the equality
of the sexes. I do, therefore, believe that it is possible to be a
conservative and a feminist8 and I am sorry that the current state
of affairs has made a Federalist Society Conference on Feminism
seem like a confrontation-it is the feminists versus the federal-
ists. There are probably very few people who arrived saying, "I am
both a feminist and a federalist." I hope that more will leave say-
ing this. I particularly hope that one of them will be Richard
Epstein.
encouraged to think about what men might need.... I am not making the claim that it is
'wrong' to try to help anyone ..... The claim is merely that, even though many feminists
do sincerely care about men, caring about men is not what feminism is about.").
6. Saying that feminism concerns both men and women is not quite the same as saying
that both men and women should be feminists, something I also believe. For, even if
feminism concerned and benefitted only women, surely at least some men-those com-
mitted to the well-being of the women in their lives or more abstractly to justice-would
ally themselves with the feminist cause even if there was nothing directly in it for them.
Thus did some whites ally themselves with the abolition and civil rights movements.
7. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender fim Sex and Orientation or the Effeminate
Man in the Law and FeministJurispndence (Forthcoming Yale LJ. 1995) (arguing that sub-
stitution of gender discrimination against the stereotypically feminine for prohibited dis-
crimination on the basis of sex now leaves men less free to engage in behavior coded
feminine than women are to engage in traditionally masculine behavior and that this fact
has undesirable consequences for both men and women).
8. My conviction that feminism is quite compatible with conservatism is fueled largely
by my long study of the history of feminist theory in western Europe from the mid-four-
teenth century to the French Revolution. Some of the most cogent and radical writings
on the equality of the sexes from that era are the product of female intellectuals notable
among their contemporaries for their conservatism on matters other than sex equality.
For a discussion of how these women, notably Christine de Pizan, Marie de Gournay,
Mary Astell and Olympe de Gouges, came to feminism, see Mary Anne Case, From the
Mirror of Reason to the Measure ofJuste, 5 YALE J.L & HumAN. 115 (1993).
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II. SocIoBIoLoGy + LIBERTARIANISM = RADICAL FEMINISM
In his Symposium contribution and elsewhere,9 Epstein urges
both libertarianism and sociobiology on feminists.10 I personally
see substantial tension between those two goals, as I shall discuss.
But to the extent that they can be combined successfully, the re-
sult may surprise Epstein. The combination of his normative lib-
ertarian opposition to the elimination of force and fraud and his
descriptive emphasis on sociobiology would logically make Ep-
stein a radical feminist." The worldview of a libertarian sociobi-
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Gender is For Nouns, 41 DEPAUL L. REv. 981 (1992); The
Authoritarian Impulse in Sex Discrimination Law: A Reply to Professors Abrams and Strauss, 41
DEPAU. L REV. 1041 (1992). Besides Kathryn Abrams's and David Strauss's replies to
Epstein, the recent legal academic literature on the intersections of feminism, sociobi-
ology and libertarianism includes RICHARD POsNFR, SEx AND REASON (1992), and the
flood of critical reviews it provoked. See, e.g., Robin West, Review Essay, Sex, Reason and a
Taste for the Absurd, 81 GEo. LJ. 2413 (1993). Sociobiology may appeal to Epstein and
Posner because for them it seems to be little more than law and economics plus sex. In
their relentless telling of sociobiological "just-so" stories, both Epstein and Posner may
have fallen victim to what Todd Preuss has called Occam's dildo. While Occam's razor
requires that of two competing explanations the simplest be selected, Occam's dildo
predicts that the most titillating of the two explanations will be preferred.
10. Epstein's suggestion that sociobiology is of use to the feminist enterprise is not an
original one. See, e.g., The primal dramatist: He sees the script of human evolution vividly played
out by the great apes, OMNa,June 1993 (interview with Harvard anthropologist and sociobi-
ologist Irven De Vore by Robert L. Trivers). Matt Cartmill's review of DONNA HARAWAY,
PRIuMATE VISIONS: GENDER, RAcE AND NATURE IN THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989) in
12 INT.J. OF PRtmATOLOGY 67, 70 (1991) ("White Capitalist Patriarchy dictated the terms
of primatological discourse until the mid-1970's, when sociobiology came along and freed
primatology from its male centered paradigms. Nowadays, 'primatology is a genre of fem-
inist theory.' (p.277)") (quoting Haraway)). Although, unlike Haraway, Epstein seems to
see sociobiology as a necessary constraint rather than a useful tool for feminists, I shall try
to show that he speaks more truly than he knows when he recommends it to them. Con-
trary to his implicit assumptions, sociobiology would support more cultural and radical
feminist views than it would undermine. I am not the first to point out the radical femi-
nist uses of biology to Epstein. See David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference and Gender Discrimi-
nation, 41 DEPAUrL L. REv. 1007, 1012 (1992). The radical feminist implications of
libertarianism are explored in SusAN MoLLa OKIN, JusrrE, GENDER AND THE FAMILY 74-
88 (1989) (demonstrating that under Nozick's entitlement theory, strictly applied, each
individual is the property of his mother, who produced him with nothing but her labor,
her body and material (i.e. sperm) she obtained by legitimate transfer).
11. I use the term radical both in its common English meaning and in the more techni-
cal one used to describe a particular school of feminist jurisprudence. Thus, while some
of the "radical" feminist positions I here attribute to Epstein are propounded by what in
technical parlance are cultural feminists (e.g. Robin West) and others are quite main-
stream, they are also in accord with the views propounded by radical feminist Catharine
MacKinnon, whose dominance approach focuses on male violence and seeks to treat wo-
men differently when to do so would prevent their subordination. I do not here endorse
the use of sociobiology by feminist jurisprudes or any other legal academics. Nor do I
endorse all the radical feminist positions I here describe. Rather, I wish only to demon-
strate that because Epstein does endorse sociobiology as well as libertarianism, he must
needs also endorse something akin to these radical feminist positions. I should note that
I have no idea where Epstein stands on most of these issues. He may entirely agree, he
may be shocked.
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ologist should closely resemble that set forth by Robin West12 or
Catharine MacKinnon; if he were unusually optimistic it might
resemble that of Martha Fineman.1 And such a person should
be inclined to favor law reforms ranging from the abolition of
marriage to adoption of a reasonable woman standard to a
strengthening of tort and criminal laws on sexual coercion.
Of course, this is not what Epstein thinks he gets by urging
sociobiology on feminists. Epstein fails to see the radical feminist
implications of his positions in part because, as I shall demon-
strate, he has got most of his sociobiological facts simply wrong
and in part because he has failed to remove the beam from his
own eye and that of other males before seeking to remove the
mote from the eye of females. In discussing what he posits to be
the relevant differences between the sexes, he systematically fo-
cuses on differences that disadvantage women but are insignifi-
cant in all senses of the word and ignores others that are not only
quite large and better documented but normatively far more im-
portant. Thus we hear from him much about males' slightly
greater average spatial and mathematical abilities and very little
about the substantially greater male propensity to violence. This
despite the fact that male violence is far more of a problem in
society than female math fear. 4 These two kinds of errors loosely
12. See, e.g., Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Cri-
tique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. WomEN's UJ. 81 (1987); Equality Themy, Marital Rape
and the Fourteenth Amendment 42 FA. L. Ray. 45,62-63 (1990); Legitimating the Illegitimate: A
Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 Cot.. L. REv. 1442 (1993).
13. See, ag., MARHA A. F'NEmnAN, THE NaurEFaD MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHr TwFNimm' CENTuRY TRAGEDIES (1994).
14. Epstein's blindness is a common one. See, e.g., Susan J. Berkson, Violence and the
'Invisible'Male, CHICAOO TRIB., July 29, 1992 at C15. ("See no gender. Hear no gender.
Speak no gender. If the gender is male.... Oh why is this country so violent, we moan.
What's wrong with Americans, we lament. Wrong questions. We should be asking, why
are men in this country so violenO What's wrong with American men? Now, before you
jump out of your seat and scream that not all men are violent, that there's nothing wrong
with American men, stop the 'man-bashing,' look at these statistics from the very manly
FBI. According to their 1990 Uniform Crime Reports, 81.6 percent of all crimes are com-
mitted by men, almost 89 percent of all violent crimes are committed by men, and 90
percent of all homicides are committed by men. This is notjust the majority, but the vast
majority, the overwhelming mjority. When women are such a vast majority - in any situa-
tion - we hear about it. But if that lopsided majority is male, we don't even see it.... We
see black. We see white. We do not see gender. If the police officers who beat Rodney
King had been women, the subject of the analyses would have been 'Women: Fit To Be
Cops?'... If women had been out on the streets shooting guns and killing motorists, Time
and Newsweek would run cover stories on 'Killer Women: The Phenomenon of Female
Violence.' But the perpetrators were male so their gender went unmentioned. Their
gender went unnoticed.... After their post-Rodney King verdict meeting with President
Bush, civil rights leaders told the press that in order for the crisis to be solved, unemploy-
ment and poverty had to be eliminated. Men with jobs don't rape? Men with money
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track the two broad kinds of biological evidence Epstein seeks to
deploy against feminists. The first, more properly called sociobio-
logical, is speculative extrapolation from evidence about non-
human primates and other animals and from imaginative recrea-
tions of the lives of our distant ancestors. 15 The second, more
simply biological, focuses on measurable, testable, quantifiable
(although often not yet well measured) differences in present
day human beings.16
A. No Norms From Nature
Before discussing the sociobiological evidence, however, let
me first consider the normative use to which it should be put.
Sociobiology strikes me initially as of little relevance to the law
and especially to the law as it should be. To rush directly from
sociobiological evidence to normative conclusion is to cry, like
don't batter? .... The only thing rapists have in common is their gender... A study by
the National Institutes of Mental Health found that battering, as well, cuts across all lines
of color and economic status. Women are angry. Women are unemployed, are mired in
poverty, have despair. Women have lots of rage at men and at a system that oppresses
them. By and large, however, women do not batter, rape, or go into the street and shoot
men. More attention might be paid if they did. Look at the uproar caused by two fic-
tional characters (Thelma and Louise) who acted on their anger and shot a sexist, abusive
man. 'Man-bashing,' the male critics cried."). Cf MicHAm. R. GoTrr=soN & TRAVIs
Hmscm, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRWME 145 (1990) ("For crimes involving force and fraud,
male arrests account for 60-99 percent of those arrested. This disproportionality charac-
terizes all official data since the FBI began collecting statistics .... Unofficial statistics...
confirm the official portrait... Men are always and everywhere more likely than women
to commit criminal acts.").
15. Epstein repeatedly refers to "the sociobiology," as though there were a unified and
coherent body of knowledge and theory regarding the behavior of non-human species
and its relevance to humans. This is not the case-different scholars often have different
interpretations of the causes of behavior in a given species. Moreover, the portraits of
human nature drawn by students of animal behavior vary dramatically, depending on
what aspects of animal behavior a scientist chooses to emphasize. It should also be noted
that the term "sociobiology" has a broad sense and a narrow sense. In the broad sense,
"sociobiology" isjust the comparative study of the social behavior of animals (including
humans). Construed narrowly, "sociobiology" implies a commitment to a particular theo-
retical agenda, in which behaviors are to be explained as evolutionary adaptations; that is,
their causes are to be sought in a history of natural selection. This latter, more narrow
view is identified with scholars such as E.O. Wilson, Robert Trivers, Irven DeVore, and
W.D. Hamilton. Students of animal behavior (sociobiologists, sensu latto) vary in their
degree of commitment to the adaptationist agenda and their degree of willingness to
speculate about past events in lieu of evidence, and thus not all would identify themselves
as sociobiologists (sensu stricto).
16. Although Epstein protests that "the actions of some hormones and neurotransmit-
ters differ sharply between the sexes" and that "we cannot act and speak as though [these
silent chemicals] have no influence over social behavior," he barely mentions what he
thinks they or their influence may be, let alone what importance it may have to feminist
legal theory or to the law more generally. Richard A. Epstein, Two Challenges for Feminist
Though 18 Ht-iv.J.L. & Pur. Por'y 338 (1995) (hereinafter Two Challenges). I shall there-
fore devote comparatively little attention here to neurobiology.
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Shakespeare's bastard villain, "Thou nature art my goddess." 17
This, to me, is a dubious invocation in light of the view, prevalent
since the ancient Greeks, that nomos and physis, law and nature,
are antithetical. 8 Law is precisely that which fights nature. If
something were all that natural, a law would not be needed to
bring it about. This is clear in almost every area of legal scholar-
ship other than those pertaining to sex and gender. It has long
puzzled and troubled me that it is only with respect to sex and
gender that nature is thought to drive law; only there does the
cry goes up, not only that whatever is is right, but that it ought to
be the law. The evidence for natural human aggression is far
stronger than any of the evidence Epstein puts forth in favor of
differences between the sexes. No one (least of all Epstein)
would, however, suggest that just because human beings are nat-
urally aggressive there should be no laws of murder and assault.
Similarly, despite recent interesting studies of the natural decep-
tiveness of human beings, 9 I don't hear anyone (least of all Ep-
stein) saying that just because human beings are naturally
deceptive we should abolish the law of fraud. I, therefore, remain
puzzled as to why any state of affairs in nature with respect to the
sexes, let alone the weak evidence we have of it, should deter-
mine the law with respect to sex and gender.
It now appears that Epstein agrees with much of this analysis,
thus revealing himself at least a heretic, if not an apostate from
nature worship. The edited version of Epstein's remarks contains
the following addition:
Normative Implications. The accumulation of biological infor-
mation about males and females has important normative im-
plicatiors for the study of human behavior and human
institutions. But in order to see these connections we must
proceed with some care. One fllacy that must to be avoided is
the assertion that there must be some necessary connection
between the natural and the good. There is no such necessary
17. Wn.ium S .s mPEAs , Kmo LEAR, act I, sc. ii. In the context of Lear, it is far from
accidental that nature is invoked by a bastard villain. After all, Lear himself insists, "Allow
not nature more than nature needs, man's life is cheap as beast's." Rd at act H, sc. IV.
And among the lessons of the play is that "unaccommodated man" is not "a poor bare
forked creature" but a clever actor, capable of taking on what roles he needs to survive. IM
at act HI, sc. V.
18. See, ag., James Q. Whitman, Law and the PReModern Mind, 44 STAN. L. Rav. 205
(1991) (reviewing DONALD R. KEau, THE HuMAN NMAsuaa SOcAL THOUGHT IN THE
WESf'ERN LEGAL TRADmON).
19. See generaly ANDREW WHrrNEN & RICHARD BYNE, MACHIAvEUiAN INTELUGENCE
(1988); ROBERT TRvRs, SocTAL EVOLUTION Ch. 16 (1985).
No. 2] 375
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connection. There are all sorts of instincts for which people
have strong biological instincts: there are people who like to
beat up their rivals, to lie, and to cheat. Indeed, it is precisely
because these instincts are so natural and inbred that they are
hard to eradicate. Our evolutionary inheritance is what we
have for better or for ill, but no -one could say that it ideally
equips us for life within the social setting.
20
I find this acknowledgement of the danger of leaping from an
is to an ought helpful. 21 Before going on to examine what nor-
mative implications from biological information are left, I think a
close reading of this passage is in order, for it points up, not only
the tension between Epstein's libertarianism and his sociobi-
ology, but also the inconsistencies between his discussion of
human nature on the one hand and the nature of males and
females on the other. Note the subtle but important nuance in
Epstein's formulation-" there are people who like to beat up their ri-
vals.. ."-suggesting that there are also those who do not.22 In
fact, aggression and deception are at least as much human
universals as nurturing is a female universal. But when it comes
to the sexes, rather than to humans more generally, Epstein
doesn't shy away from universals-he insists, for example, that
"any male can generate sperm by the billions"21 although, of
course, many males are infertile. He states categorically that
"[m]ales will take the initiative [in courtship] ... [flemales will
20. Two Challenges, supfa note 16, at 339.
21. While Epstein has in the past said that he "do[es] not wish to be understood as
say ng that whatever patterns of behavior that one finds in life should be regarded as
immune from social criticism and reformation solely because they are at root 'natural' or
biological", he has also insisted that "often it seems best to make peace with natural differ-
ences instead of railing against them." RICHARD A. EpsrmF, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AOGANSr EMPLO hENT DiSC~arINATION LAws 275 (1992). He has generally supported
this eagerness to capitulate to nature with the assertion that "[i]f features of human be-
havior are regarded as biological, then the cost of change becomes higher, so that the
quantity of change that should ideally be demanded through either the political or social
process will be correspondingly reduced." Epstein, supra note 9, at 1012. This assump-
tion that the natural is per se more costly or difficult to change than the "socially con-
structed" has already been convincingly refuted by, among others, David Strauss, in his
reply to Gender isfor Nouns. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 994 (using the example of eye-
glasses correcting "natural" nearsightedness to demonstrate that there is no necessary
connection between what is natural and what is difficult to change). See also CATHRNE A.
MAcKINNON, hifference and Dominance, in FFrNNiSM UNMODimED at 41. ("Does this differen-
tial describe the sex difference? Maybe so. It does describe the systematic relegation of
an entire group of people to a condition of inferiority and attribute it to their nature. If
this difference were biological, maybe biological intervention would have to be consid-
ered. If it were evolutionary, perhaps men would have to evolve differently.").
22. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 339.
23. Id. at 335.
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play hard-to-get."24 Not "there are males who" or "many males"
but simply "males."25 That this is notjust sloppy phrasing can be
seen from his formulation of a similar point in other writings. In
Gender is for Nouns, for example, he conceded that, "All forms of
aggression and cheating come quite naturally to many people who
are actuated by narrow self-interest." 26 To be accurate, Epstein
would have to say, as would any sociobiologist, that aggression
and cheating come quite naturally to us all (unless of course by
24. Id. at 336.
25. Id. at 336. Never mind that even sociobiologists do not assert this courtship pattern
as universally as Epstein. Never mind also the social reinforcement that condemns sexual
aggressiveness or "forwardness" in girls and shyness in boys. Parenthetically, I am at a
complete loss as to what conclusions about law Epstein wants us to draw from his sociobio-
logical speculations about courtship patterns and early puberty. Surely as a libertarian he
does not want to regulate who asks whom on a date. Is he justifying differential ages for
marriage? Surely as a libertarian he sees marriage as a contract. Is he saying men should
be withheld from contracting until a later age? Will their raging hormones at puberty
render them unfit to enter a binding marital agreement? Is he, like Diderot, reserving
young women for mature men and denying older women the right to marry? Is he en-
dorsing teen pregnancy? Could he be saying no means yes?
26. Epstein, supra note 9, at 994. The fullest statement of Epstein's view that force and
fraud are not human universals may come in the chapter of FORBIDDEN GROUNDS titled
"Human Nature." There, he notes that, "It may be objected that, however essential the
control of force is to the legal and social order, [the social contract tradition's] descrip-
tion of chaos in a world without law rests on too pessimistic a view of humanity. Its
Hobbesian emphasis on the brutish side of human nature is grim, relentless and mono-
chromatic. It does a disservice to the large number of decent people who find the use of
force abhorrent, and who are unable and unwilling to practice the fine art of deceit. As a
descriptive matter this counterargument contains much truth. Surely we should not want
to judge the mainstream of human -conduct by looking at the worst actions of the worst
individuals. The forces of self-interest may lurk in us all, but they express themselves in
different ways. For some people self-interest leads to creativity and cooperation, or it en-
courages them to excel at helping and not hurting. Only in a small, hardened minority
does self-interest translate into the gleeful tendency to perform actions destructive of the
welfare of others.... [W]e can simplify the rich mosaic of human types by positing a
single characteristic-virtue-which is the sum of all desirable human qualities. It is dis-
tributed across three groups: first, those that have the welfare of others close to heart;
second that great mass of persons.., at the mean.., who have ... individual self-interest
tempered by a sense of 'confined generosity' toward others; and third, individuals for
whom self-interest is everything, and who will stop short of theft and murder only if con-
fronted with a force stronger than their own. Even this formula understates the level of
variation.... Ordinary people would not steal or kill even if the severity of the punish-
ment were raised or lowered by 10 percent." Epstein, supra note 21, at 16-19. Cf. Two
Challenges, supra note 16, at 334 (describing the dominant drive as individual self-interest,
which excludes acting for the benefit of a biological stranger).
Where are the supposedly so all-important sex differences in Epstein's general discus-
sion of human nature? Given what Epstein says about female nature in Two Chalenges, he
should expect to see women disproportionately represented on the altruistic end of the
human spectrum; yet here Epstein has nothing to say about sex differences. Cf. Robin
West, Jurioupnene and Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. Rav. 1 (1988) ("[A]ccording to Hobbes,
'men' are naturally inclined to aggress against those they perceive as the vulnerable other.
Again, women are not: infants are dependent upon mothers and vulnerable to them, yet
the natural mother does not aggress against her child, she breast-feeds her."). In empha-
sizing virtuous behavior, Epstein may be seen as aligning himselfwith the feminine as well
as the feminist.
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"many people" he means all males, a statement which, given the
evidence of the differential male propensity to violent aggression
might be plausible, but, given Epstein's emphasis on distinguish-
ing by sex in other areas quite disingenuous-why highlight sex
differences everywhere else and obscure them when they put
males in a bad light?) Epstein does admit that "[iut would be
foolish to say that all men are categorically different from all wo-
men,"27 but his language seems to succumb to this foolishness
altogether too often.2
B. Better an Autonomous Individual Than Just an Egg
In insisting on the group characteristics of males and females
while downplaying those of humans more generally, such as their
propensity to force and fraud, Epstein is simultaneously insuffi-
ciently libertarian and insufficiently true to sociobiology. Cor-
recting the latter failing would have important consequences for
his suggestion that feminists use sociobiology, as I shall demon-
strate below. First I shall consider the former failing in light of
his suggestion that feminists also be libertarians.
Epstein correctly describes Justice Joseph Bradley's concurring
opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois as "the antithesis of a libertarian
position, and [one which] should be rejected even by those who
think that the biological differences beween the sexes do make a
difference in their occupational preferences."29 He fails to real-
ize that while indeed the antithesis of a libertarian position, Brad-
ley's is the embodiment of the very sort of vulgar sociobiological
view he champions. Like Epstein, the portion of the opinion Ep-
stein specifically repudiates asserts that
nature herself has always recognized a wide difference in the
respective sphere and destinies of man and woman.30 Man is,
27. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 338.
28. While Epstein incorrectly assumes that violence is only at the margins, he focuses
only on the margins when it comes to measurable differences between men and women.
Male and female spatial and math abilities differ, if at all, only on the margin, where the
demands of modem daily life rarely push us. My own mathematical abilities are not even
remotely tested by my job; indeed, my feeble female brain could probably even handle all
the math in Epstein's work. Moreover, as a father, Epstein, I hope, has more experience
nurturing children than I do, and ain't I a woman, ain't Epstein a man? The day should
long have passed when the professional female intellectual was viewed as a freak of na-
ture. See Mary Anne Case, From the Mirror of Reason to the Measure ofJuslice, 5 YALE J.L. &
HuMAN. 115, 134 (1993). I hope the day is soon at hand when the nurturing male will be
equally unremarkable.
29. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 346.
30. Cf id. at 342.
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or should be, woman's protector and defender.3 ' The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belong to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil
life.3 2 The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in ... the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and func-
tions of womanhood.3 The harmony, not to say the identity of
interests and views which belong or should belong to the fam-
ily institution, is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her hus-
band.3 4. .. It is true that many women are unmarried and not
affected by any of the duties, complications and incapacities
arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to
the general rule.3 5 The paramount destiny and mission of wo-
man are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.3 6 This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil
society must be adapted to the general constitution of things,
and cannot be based on exceptional cases.3
7
31. Cf. id. at 341.
32. Cf. id. at 337.
33. Cf. id. at 337-38.
34. Cf. id
35. Epstein, of course, pays lip service to male/female variety, more so, in fact, than he
does to the notion that aggression and deception are human universals. But his occa-
sional acknowledgements cannot paper over his general tendency to reduce the members
of each sex to dichotomously gendered traits.
36. Cf Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 337-38.
37. Bradwellv. The Stat4 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872). Cf Two Challenges, supra note 16, at
347; Richard A. Epstein, Rule of Sex-Blind Jurisprudence Isn't Always Fair, WALL ST. J., July 21,
1993, at A15 ("Outmoded stereotypes are one thing, but accurate statistical generaliza-
tions are quite another."). The extent of the truth of the proposition that "the rules of
civil society must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based
on exceptional cases" is an extremely interesting and difficult question and one well be-
yond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that sometimes we precisely do legislate for
the exception, not the rule: consider for instance, Epstein's own assertion that the crimi-
nal law is made for the exceptional bad man, not the overwhelming majority of law abid-
ing citizens; that because "law must control the most lawless" one should not look at its
effects "on the average members of the population" but on "those people close to the
line". See Epstein, supra note 21, at 19. At other times, we "adapt our rules" precisely so as
to leave room for the exception; we often have, and in my view should have, especial
solicitude for the exceptional case; the areas of law in which we tend do this include
much of constitutional jurisprudence, from the protections of criminal procedure (better
that 10 guilty men go free...) to the First Amendment and, of course, our current sex
discrimination law. See Los Angvles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708
(1977) ("The question, therefore, is whether the existence of 'discrimination' is to be
determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics. A 'stereo-
typed' answer to that question may not be the same as the answer that the language and
purpose of the statute commmand. The statute makes it unlawful 'to discriminate against
any individual because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.'
The statute's focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes treatment of individu-
als as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class. If height is re-
quired for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the
average, women are too short. Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient
reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply."). In
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In short, we see reproduced in Epstein's essay a microcosm of
the uneasy alliance of libertarians and traditionalists in the con-
servative movement. I would be prepared myself, although I can-
not speak for all feminists, 8 to take quite seriously and be
sympathetic toward the libertarian half of his agenda. In part it
relies on exactly what the sociobiological half of the agenda de-
nies, that is my individuality, the fact that I am not simply an
egg 9 as Epstein the sociobiologist would have it, but I am a full
person, free, rational and autonomous.40 I would much rather
other words, we legislate for the exception whenever we perceive the cost of error as high,
practically (e.g. theft) or in terms of our commitments and values.
38. See generally Martha A. Fineman's comments at Symposium (arguing that women
lead gendered lives and are affected far more than men by inevitable and derivative de-
pendency because of their roles as mothers and as caregivers for those, like children and
the elderly, who are not and cannot be as autonomous as libertarian theory demands).
The libertarian/traditionalist split may also, interestingly, in some ways parallel that be-
tween liberal and cultural feminists.
39. According to Epstein, "the differences in behavior between males and females are
as fundamental and enduring as the differences between sperm and eggs." Two challenges,
supra note 16, at 335. His view seems to be that, just as eggs sit still and sperm swim
around, so females are destined to be passive and males active in all things from court-
ship, to the division of labor in the family (women should sit at home and let men go
exploring), to performance in the workforce (women will be overly cautious, men com-
pete). See Epstein, supra note 9. Here once again, he is wrong both about the evidence
with respect to reproduction and about the implications of that evidence with respect
narrowly to reproduction for the rest of the behaviors of men and women. His view of
passive eggs and active sperm is old-fashioned and outdated:just as behavioral biology has
recently focused on female choice in mating, so reproductive biology has progressed far
from the quasi-Aristotelian days when conception was seen as the male generative princi-
ple acting on inert female matter. See, e.g., Ann Gibbons & Marcia Barinaga, Feminists find
gender everywhere in science, 260 Sci. 392 (1993) (noting that "the egg's active role in fertili-
zation went unexplored for decades" because "the view of the egg as passive and the
sperm as active nicely fit social stereotypes of men and women"); William Booth, Human
Egg Found Able to Signal Sperm; Attractant May be Crucial for Fertility, WASH. Posr, April 1,
1991, at Al.
Even were Epstein to have been right about the relative activity of eggs and sperm, it is
still quite a leap (one Epstein acknowledges he attempts on sheer speculation, citing no
scientific evidence) from the microcosm to the macrocosm, from eggs and sperm to men
and women and from reproductive strategies to workplace performance. See Epstein,
supra note 9, at 992. Cf Helena Cronin, Oh ThoseBonobos! N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 1993, § 7,
at 19 (reviewing MEarrm SMALL, FEMALE CHoicEs: SExUAL BEHAVIOR OF FEMALE PRI.
mATFs) ("Eggs are not diminutive women, nor sperm macho homunculi"); Kathryn
Abrams, Social Construction, Roving Biologism, and Reasonalde Women: A Response to Professor
Epstein, 41 DEPAuL L. REV. 1021, 1028-29 (1992) (demanding "to know the reasons why
race-car drivers should-through conscious effort or instinct-apply strategies for repro-
ductive success when entering the Indy 500"). For a correction of the false assumption
that even male and female reproductive strategy dichotomize as Epstein assumes they do,
see infra note 73.
40. Cf Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HAav. J.L &
PuB. POL'y 713, 727 (1989) (asserting that, while the "assumption of individual autonomy
- that all individuals are free, equal and independent in the state of nature" - is common
to both utilitarian and natural law theories, "[w]ithin the family context, individual auton-
omy is not a dominant theme"); Two Challenge, supra note 16, at 337 (assuming women
are and ought to be confined largely within the family- "And if the female devotes more
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have my libertarian individualist self taken into account, than
have Epstein reduce me to my reproductive organs and raging
hormones or to a member of a less than fully human class of
women.
41
One way that this can be done is for Epstein to apply his own
caveats about a too universalist view of human nature to his dis-
cussion of the natures of males and females. About humans more
generally, Epstein has said:
A balanced view of society, and of the role of law, requires us
to recognize differences in character and temperament just as
we recognize differences in height and weight. . .. The un-
compromising Hobbesian view of human nature is surely over-
drawn as a universal portrait. Whatever the biological origins
of humankind, manifold social pressures lead to cooperation
as well as conflict, to excellence as well as depravity. To portray
people only in harsh tones is to develop a skewed picture of
human nature that ignores the enormous variation among in-
dividuals. The model can only lead to mistaken judgments
about the proper normative political order.
42
One might, however, respond that the uncompromising Ep-
steinian view of male and female nature is surely overdrawn as a
universal portrait. Whatever the biological origins of humankind,
manifold social pressures lead to female assertiveness as well as
nurturing, to male fidelity as well as promiscuity. To portray
males and females only in dichotomous tones is to develop a
skewed picture of human nature that ignores the enormous vari-
ation among individuals. The model can only lead to mistaken
judgments about the proper normative political order.4' And,
though the criminal law must needs legislate against the excep-
tion-deterring the bad man and not just the majority of law-
abiding citizens44-the civil law, as Epstein points out in his de-
fense of libertarianism as a feminist strategy, can leave room for
the exception-even if Bradley (or, for that matter Epstein the
sociobiologist) is right that most women are unsuited by nature
time in dealing with offspring, then she will spend less time in dealing with strangers, that
is, in dealing in transactions at arm's length, for which the vocabulary of rights is
designed.").
41. Cf. West, supra note 26.
42. Epstein, supra note 21, at 16-18.
43. If Epstein protests that recognizing variety is exactly what he has done, I must insist
that the overall tone of his remarks is quite otherwise - howeve'many asides he may make
about variety, he has come to praise a universalizing and dichotomous view of the sexes,
not to bury it.
44. See Epstein, supra note 21.
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to the practice of law, there is no need to interfere with the lib-
erty of the exceptional ones by categorically restricting the op-
portunities of their sex.
Given this it is disturbing to read in Epstein's criticism of Ruth
Bader Ginsburg's 1970's sex discrimination jurisprudence a
blithe willingness to legislate categorically to the detriment of ex-
ceptional women and men with no more justification than specu-
lation about administrative convenience or about popular
preferences for traditional sex roles. According to Epstein, in
Reed v. Reed45, "the state made no effort to show that decedents
generally preferred men to women as executors. But if that show-
ing could have been made, then the statute should have been
upheld. The state would have set up a default rule that best mir-
rors the preferences of ordinary citizens who have the right to
choose executors of their choice."6 But this is Epstein the utili-
tarian speaking, not Epstein the libertarian let alone Epstein the
sociobiologist. A thoroughgoing libertarian might instead choose
the default rule that maximized liberty, while the sociobiologist
might suggest that the tiebreaker should be certainty of genetic
relationship to the deceased.47
That Epstein is at heart neither a libertarian nor a sociobiolo-
gist but a rule utilitarian who makes use of both approaches only
when convenient becomes clearer in his discussion of subsequent
sex discrimination cases. According to Epstein, the
statutory schemes [in Frontiero v. Richardson48 and Califano v.
Goldfarb49] made a great deal more sense than the one in
Reed. In justifying sex-based classifications, why must the law
treat unlike cases alike? If 90% of women were in fact depen-
dent on husbands and only 3% of men on wives-roughly the
numbers in Goldfarb-then it is good economics, not insidi-
ous stereotypes, to treat the two situations differently. To re-
quire proof of dependency for wives creates an unnecessary
administrative headache since an automatic rule already
reaches the right result 90% of the time. Better to spare the
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971)
46. Epstein, supra note 37, at A15.
47. This would, of course, favor mothers over fathers, grandmothers over grandfathers,
and maternal kin over paternal kin. Cf JOHN H. BEcsTROM, EvoLurToNARY JUIusPRU.
DENCE (1989) (sociobiological analysis of inheritance patterns).
48. 411 U.S. 677 (1972) (striking down requirement that husbands but not wives of
armed services personnel prove dependency on their spouse as a condition for the
couple's eligibility for various benefits).
49. 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (striking down requirement that widowers, but not widows,
prove dependency on their deceased spouse as a condition for receiving survivors'
benefits).
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paperwork and use the savings to increase the overall benefit
levels. To pay benefits to male spouses without scrutiny leads
to massive overpayments requiring either additional budget
appropriations or benefit reductions. The sex classifications in
Frontiero and Goldfarb are perfectly sensible and should have
been sustained unless and until the underlying behavioral pat-
terns shift. 50
Epstein refers to the result in Frontiero and Goldfarb as requiring
the law to "treat unlike cases alike." In fact, of course, the cases
of Goldfarb and a widow, as well as of Frontiero and a male of-
ficer are exactly alike-that was Ruth Bader Ginsburg's point as
their counsel. The only difference is that the the plaintiffs are
exceptional, their opposite sex counterparts are the norm-they
come from classes that are different 51 But if Epstein is right to
treat even that portion of the Bradley concurrence describing
the legal treatment of exceptions as "the antithesis of a liberta-
rian position",52 he should want similarly situated individuals to
be treated similarly regardless of the general tendencies of the
class from which they come.53Even under a utilitarian calculus,54
50. Epstein, supra note 37, at A15.
51. I do not mean to create the false impression that Messrs. Frontiero and Goldfarb
were the masculine equivalents of the exceptional woman. On the contrary, neither di-
verged far from conventional male biography. Frontiero was a student with veterans'
benefits while Goldfarb only had a claim to greater Social Security payments through his
wife because, as a retired federal employee, he was not part of the Social Security system.
52. See Two chalengs, supra note 16, at 346. Indeed, a true libertarian might see what
happened to Mrs. Goldfarb as a taking - her tax money went to non-dependent widows
rather than to her or her spouse. See Weinberger v. Wzesenfeld 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975)
("[S]he not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly
situated male would have received, but she also was deprived of a portion of her own
earnings in order to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to
others.").
53. See, e g., Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhar 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1977);
McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151,161,162 (1914) (rejecting argument
that limited demand by blacks justified providing sleeping cars only for whites on grounds
that it made the right "depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated
against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one.
Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless be conditioned on
there being a reasonable demand therefor, but if facilities are provided, substantial equal-
ity of persons traveling under like conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual who is
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied... a facility or conven-
ience... which under substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another....
he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded."); Missouri
ex rel Gaines, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938) ("Here petitioner's right was a personal one. It was
as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was
bound to furnish him. . . facilities ... substantially equal to those which the State af-
forded for persons of the white race whether or not other negroes sought the same
opportunity.").
54. And, again, there is little reason to believe this is the correct calculus, either from a
libertarian or a conventional constitutional law perspective. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
No. 2]
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Epstein seems to have gotten it wrong. Consider the Goldberg
statistics as Epstein himself presents them. If, indeed, a full 10%
of the widows are unqualified, "sparing the paperwork" and pay-
ing them all is much more likely to result in "massive overpay-
ments" than in "savings": the cost-benefit analysis works out
Epstein's way only if the additional administrative cost of deter-
mining widows' dependency at the time of death exceeds the life-
time payout to the unqualified 10%; even accounting for
extreme bureaucratic inefficiency this is hard to imagine. 5 Simi-
larly, in Frontiero, the Court specifically found that, on the facts,
there simply was no saving of administrative costs.5" Thus, even
before the dignitary harms to women and the benefits of giving a
Three Factors in Search ofa Value, 44 U. CHr. L REv. 28, 49 (1976) ("Finally, it is not clear
that the utilitarian balancing analysis asks the constitutionally relevant questions. The due
process clause is one of those Bill of Rights protections meant to insure individual liberty
in the face of contrary collective action. Therefore, a collective legislative or administra-
tive decision about procedure, one arguably... representing an optimum position from
the contemporary social perspective, cannot answer the constitutional question of
whether due process has been accorded. A balancing analysis that would have the Court
merely redetermine the question of social utility is similarly inadequate. There is no rea-
son to believe that the Court has superior competence or legitimacy as a utilitarian bal-
ancer except as it performs its peculiar institutional role of insuring that libertarian values
are considered in the calculus of decision.").
55. The calculus would seem to tip even further against Epstein when one considers
that, under the specific terms of the law, dependency for either sex only becomes an issue
after an obligatory determination, whose bureaucratic cost cannot be avoided, that other
criteria have been met, notably that the survivor's benefits in his or her own right are less
than those available through a spouse. Among the subset of surviving spouses who meet
all the other eligibility criteria, widows, I suspect, are more likely than widowers to fail the
dependency criteria for at least the following reasons: a) wives tend to be younger than
husbands and therefore still in the workforce at the time of their spouses' death; b) wo-
men often take time out from the workforce for childbearing and rearing, depressing
their overall benefit levels more than their income at the time of their spouses' death; c)
in couples where one person's income is earned and the other unearned (and therefore
not eligible for insurance benefits), the wage earner is more likely to be the husband.
Moreover, the small number of males and large number of females who meet all other
criteria, the economies of scale in processing, and the comparatively larger benefits due
wage-earning males, whose incomes, on average are higher, might even possibly make it
no less efficient in terms of absolute dollars to require proof of dependency from widows
only - Epstein would then have it exactly backwards. For some figures, see Mary Becker,
Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein and
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 CoL L REv. 264, 273 (1989).
56. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1972) ("[T]he government offers
no concrete evidence ... tending to support its view that such differential treatment in
fact saves the government money. .. , that it is actually cheaper to grant increased benefits
to all male members, than it is to determine which male members are in fact entitled to
such benefits and grant increased benefits only to [them]. Here, however, there is sub-
stantial evidence that, if put to the test, many of the wives of male members would fail to
qualify for benefits. [Citing labor statistics.] And in light of the fact that the dependency
determination with respect to the husbands of female members is presently made solely
on the basis of affidavits, rather than through the more costly hearing process, the Gov-
ernment's explanation of the statutory scheme is, to say the least, questionable."); Cf
Epstein, supra note 37, at A15.
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couple the liberty to structure their lives without disproportion-
ate disincentives57 are factored in, the statutes' costs outweigh
their benefits.5"
If only Epstein were as committed to "universal liberty" and "a
willingness to expand opportunities for all individuals"59 as he
urges feminists to be, he might realize the limits for women's
liberty in his utilitarian calculus. As Amartya Sen has pointed out,
"freedom as such is not valued in the utilitarian calculus." 0 It
also fails to take account the extent to which those, such as "the
thoroughly subjugated housewife ... in circumstances of long-
standing disparity and inequity ... learn to adjust their desires
and pleasures accordingly, since it makes little sense to pine for
what does not seem feasible";6' for such "chronically deprived"
people, who "have all learned to keep their desires in check and
to make the most of whatever tiny experiences of relief come
their way... the utilitarian calculus is deeply biased."62 If Epstein
were a more thoroughgoing libertarian, he might join with Sen
in acknowledging that:
In an objective sense, women... are indeed less free to do
various things than men are, and there is nothing in the world
to indicate that women will not value more freedom when they
actually come to experience it (rather than taking it to be 'un-
feasible' or 'unnatural'). The absence of present discontent or
felt radical desires cannot wipe out the moral -significance of
this inequality if individual freedom-including the freedom
57. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 10, at 1016; Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Toward
Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Eficieny and Social Change, 103 YALE LJ. 595, 649
(1993) ("Epstein ironically commits a version of the sin for which he so often condemns
others: he forgets to respect individual autonomy. By focusing only on firms, on the insti-
tutional or demand side of the market, where he finds no monopoly power or irrational
behavior, Epstein fails to see that individuals, on the supply side, are not being allowed to
optimize, to pursue their vision of the good life as best their endowments might allow.
Where individuals are blocked by market fhilures from pursuing their life plans, efficiency
talk loses much of its normative appeal.").
58. Thus the statutes might fail even a rational basis test (see Frontiero, 341 F. Supp. at
208). Additionally, quite apart from equal protection concerns, they might violate proce-
dural due process under the test formulated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. That test
arguably would find sex-neutral evidentiary procedures to be constitutionally required
because the increased administrative costs would be less than the increased social benefit
(even if the latter is measured only in dollars saved the fisc from payments withheld from
non-dependent wives, let alone when broader tangible and intangible benefits to women
and their families are factored in). SeeJEPRuY L. MAsHAW, DuE PROCESS AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATIv STATE 102 (1985).
59. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 346.
60. Amartya Sen, IndividualFreedom as a Social Commitment N.Y. REv. OF Booxs,June 14,
1990, at 49.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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to assess one's situation and the possibilities of changing it-is
accepted as a major value. While the defenders of the status
quo can get comfort and support from at least some versions
of the utilitarian calculus, that defense cannot survive if indi-
vidual freedom is indeed a social commitment.6 3
C. The Facts of Life
With these considerations in mind, let us now turn to the nor-
mative use to which Epstein wishes to put the descriptive infor-
mation furnished by sociobiology. Recall that Epstein has
renounced the notion that nature, and therefore that sociobi-
ology, is an appropriate source of norms. He continues:
The question still remains, however, as to what framework will
tell us which types of natural instincts should be honored, and
which should be suppressed. My own view is that the question
should be answered by looking to see what forms of human
behavior advance overall social welfare. In that inquiry, the
distinction between force and fraud on the one hand, and vol-
untary contract on the other must play a central role.64
It might seem at first glance that sociobiology has no useful
role to play in this endeavor. Surely, unless we look to nature for
our norms, the inquiry into what forms of human behavior will
advance social welfare can most readily be made without refer-
ence to the genetic origins of the behavior, to whether it may
have advanced the welfare of our ancestors on the primitive sa-
vannah or to whether it is a behavior also engaged in by "the
various primates that are not capable of reflective and conscious
reorganization of their social life."65 Such inquiries seem at best
irrelevant and at worst may confuse the issue. Nevertheless, Ep-
stein insists that "[t]he accumulation of biological information
about males and females has important normative implications
for the study of human behavior and human institutions."66 It
turns out that what he has in mind is something akin to an evi-
dentiary presumption: Seeing a behavior in nature is, for Ep-
stein, a sign that it is the product neither of arbitrary convention
63. Amartya Sen, IndividualFreedom as a Social Commitmen4 N.Y. Rxv. oF Booixs,June 14,
1990, at 49, 51. For more on how women have "learned to adjust their desires and
pleasures" as a result of systemic male violence, see Irv DeVore, Robin West and discus-
sion thereof, infra text accompanying notes 109-14.
64. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 339.
65. Id. at 333-34.
66. Id. at 339.
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nor of "domination, exploitation and subordination".67 It there-
fore, he assumes, should be immune from feminist criticism on
either of these grounds.
There are several difficulties with this assumption. The most
significant, about which I will say much more later, is that it es-
tablishes a false dichotomy between "domination, exploitation
and subordination" on the one hand and the natural on the
other: by reading force and fraud out of nature, it reintroduces
the previously rejected premise that "there must be some neces-
sary connection between the natural and the good."6 3 This sug-
gests that Epstein may only have been paying lip service to a
renunciation of faith in nature, like a believer in time of persecu-
tion sacrificing to what he sees as false idols. Nature really is his
goddess after all; what's more he sees her as a benevolent deity.
Even were Epstein's premises in order, however, the conclusions
he wishes to draw from them would not follow because, as I shall
show, the evidence does not support them.
In taking up Epstein's challenge,6 9 1 propose to treat the soci-
obiological evidence as seriously as Epstein urges feminists to do,
and follow through its implications. Another, to my mind quite
sensible, approach would be to inquire even more seriously into
its relevance and significance in our world. Such an approach
might begin by invoking John Stuart Mill, one of Epstein's cul-
ture heroes, for the proposition that, "[o]f all the vulgar modes
of escaping from the consideration of the effect of social and
moral influences upon the human mind, the most vulgar is that
of attributing the diversities of conduct and character to inher-
ent natural differences."70 It might go on to wonder why Epstein
thinks "[i]t is therefore of especial irony to note that it is only
with modem technology that we find it possible to relax the
traditional sex roles within the family.""' After observing that the
word traditional is apt, for it is indeed tradition-custom not na-
ture-that creates the roles Epstein describes, it might go on to
discuss both the role social construction has played in establish-
ing the sex roles Epstein values so highly and the way our own
67. Id. at 341.
68. Id. at 339.
69. "Feminism should confront much more explicitly the biological constraints on
human behavior. Many distinguished biologists consider these constraints to be quite
strong." Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 333.
70. John Stuart Mill as quoted inANNE FAusro-STmERNG'S MYTS OF GENDER 123 (1985).
71. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 342.
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society, with its modem technology and egalitarian commit-
ments, does indeed make it both possible and desirable to relax
them. Notwithstanding my sympathy with such an approach, I
shall not follow it here.72
Instead, I propose to meet Epstein's challenge on the ground
he has chosen, that of the primitive savannah, and with his
choice of weapons, libertarian norms and biological evidence.73
My goal, naturally, is not the aggressive masculine one of winning
a battle with him, but the cooperative, feminine one of bringing
him into the feminist fold.
One can tell at least two very differently colored stories about
the relations between the sexes from a sociobiological perspec-
tive: The rosy one some natural scientists are trying to tell about
female choice and male cooperation should lead Epstein to femi-
nism because he is predisposed toward the natural.74 The darker
72. For such an approach, see, eg., Abrams, supra note 39.
73. I do not propose to fight for every inch of the territory, however. To catalogue all
the errors Epstein makes in his discussion of sociobiology, I would need to be far better
trained in the natural sciences and to write a book. Although I shall generally confine
myself to a brief discussion of some problems with those of his premises most central to
his argument and mine, let me by way of illustration of what might be said did time,
space, information and energy permit, examine just one of Epstein's myriad minor prem-
ises in light of actual biological evidence. Consider Epstein's assertion that females are
monogamous by nature. It is simply false that "[m]ating with many males produces little
additional gain, especially after fertilization takes place, and may well produce some sub-
stantial loss, such as the substitution of an inferior male as the father." Two Challenges,
supra note 16, at 336. In fact, the reasons why a female might, and (in many species
including ours does) profitably mate with more than one male are many. For example,
1) confusing paternity by mating with several males can give each of these males the
incentive to behave as if he were the father;, this may prevent a male from attacking her
while pregnant or killing her offspring once they are born, as a male interested in hasten-
ing the day she mates with him and bears his child may do; on the positive side, it may
induce each of the potential fathers to be solicitous of her children; 2) it may allow her to
substitute a higher status male as the father while remaining in a pair bond with an "infer-
ior" male who will help raise the child (i.e. it enables division of male reproductive labor
between a sperm donor and a father figure); 3) it may promote sperm competition.
Scientists have documented each of these effects in both humans and other animals. See,
e.g., MA BAKER & R.R. BETLIT, HuMAN SPERM COMPETION: COPULATION, MASrURBATION
AND INF.DELrIY (forthcoming 1995); Robert Wright, Infidelity: It May Be in our Genes, TIME,
August 15, 1994; Rosie Woodroffe & Amanda Vincent, Mothers Little Helpers: Patterns of
Male Care in Mammals, 9 TRENDs IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUrION 294, 295, 296 (August 1994).
None of this means that monogamy should not be valued in human society, only that it
comes no more "naturally" to females than to males.
74. Cf Jane Lancaster, Introduction to MErDrrn SMALL, FEMALE PIMATES: STUDIES BY
WOMEN PRMATOLOGiSTS 1-12 (1984) (Examining four areas of sexual dimorphism). See
also HARAWAy, supra note 10. ([I]n each case, the point is that 'females too do x.' It turns
out that 1) females are competitive and take dominance seriously; 2) females too wander
and are not embodiments ofsocial attachment and conservatism; 3) females too are sexu-
ally assertive; and 4) females have energy demands in their lives as great as those of
males.... Lancaster's is an origin story about property in the individual body; it is a
classic entry in the large text of liberal political theory, rewritten in the language of repro-
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one, rife with male violence, will commit him even more dramati-
cally to radical feminism, because he is even more predisposed
against force and fraud, however natural. Although Epstein
stresses what he calls an "upbeat" view, I will focus instead on
nature's Hobbesian rather than its Lockean 5 aspects, because it
seems to me that the evidence on the points that most clearly
intersect Epstein's discussion more fully supports what he calls "a
very grim view." 6 I will also focus largely on the implications of
the combination of sociobiological and libertarian commitments
for criminal and tort law, because libertarians concede there
should be a criminal and tort law, in the way they do not concede
there should be, for example, an employment discrimination
law, and because these are also the areas of law where violence
and its control are most salient.
No matter which of the two visions, or what combination of
them, one chooses, however, the implications seem quite differ-
ent from those imagined by Epstein, but quite familiar to radical
feminists. These alternative implications, whose ramifications for
the law I shall consider, can be summed up somewhat tenden-
tiously under the headings "Men are Well Nigh Useless" and
"Men are Slime."77 The sociobiological evidence unfortunately
ductive strategy.... In the reconstruction of the female primate as an active generator of
primate society through active sexuality, physical mobility, energetic demands on self and
environment, and social competitition ... female (human) nature is reconstructed to
have the capacity to be a citizen, a member of a public 'we,' one who constructs public
knowledge, a scientist.)."
75. Compare THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (describing human life in the state of nature
as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" due to the war of each against all) to JOHN
LocKu, SEcoND TREnrEs ON Crvn. Gov usaNT (describing a natural state of relative
abundance in which potential peaceful coexistence and co-operation is sabotaged by a
few aggressive individuals). Cf DiscovEa, March 1993 (Nicknaming aggressive young
male baboon who harasses females pregnant by other males to induce abortion
"Hobbes").
76. Two Challenge, supra note 16, at 343.
77. The proposition that "Men Are Slime" is not mine, but one that evolutionary psy-
chologist David Buss endorses in his contribution to this volume. See David M. Buss, Evolu-
tion and Human Mating, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 537 (1995). The proposition that
"Men Are Well Nigh Useless" is suggested by the comments of Martha Fineman at the
Symposium. See Martha L. Fineman, Feminist Theory and Law, 18 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
349 (1995). Fineman sought to "rais[e] the question in biological terms of what role
besides donating sperm there is for men in our contemporary society, where women are
not only working as market actors, but in fact assuming the major responsibility for chil-
dren." Id. at transcript 36. As I will show, her question might well be asked in a broader
sociobiological context, not merely about contemporary society. Cf Richard A. Epstein,
The Varieties ofSelfInteres, 8 Soc. PHuI. & POL'Y 102 (1990) (speculating on why two sexes
are preferable to one or three for reproductive purposes) to the findings of the University
of British Columbia at Vancouver's RosemaryJ. Redfield, as reported in Birds Do It, Bees Do
It... But It's Such a Bother, WASH. Posr, May 23, 1994, at B1 (computer simulation of
relative costs and benefits shows that "the biological costs of sex for females outweigh any
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suggests that interaction with males does not typically provide the
sort of benefits to females Epstein posits and often can do them
much harm.
1. Men are Well Nigh Useless
The behavior Epstein posits as offering the greatest gains from
trade between the sexes-the division of labor between a female
who specializes in reproduction and the nurturing of the young
and a male who protects and provisions her and her offspring-
is simply not found among any non-human primates or other
animals. Epstein's hypothetical sexual division of labor notwith-
standing, no female in nature, having given birth, can lie back
and expect her mate to bring her dinner. On the contrary, the
first thing females in many species must do postpartem is go
hunting-childbirth may leave them weak, but it also leaves
them hungry. Thus, "a situation in which a mother, the moment
after childbirth, took up her hunting implements and sallied
forth into the woods", a situation Epstein asks us to imagine only
for the purpose of mocking it, is quite true to nature.78 The only
part of this "imagin[ary]" account that is counterfactual is the
supposition that the mother can "leav[e] the newborn infant in
the care of its father": 9 "Males that remain with their mates are
expected to be predisposed to paternal care; the surprise is that
many males do not care for their offspring, despite remaining in
close proximity to the female and young.""0 The vast majority of
vertebrates do not share food at all. Even the exceptions do not
exhibit the pattern preferred by Epstein."'
proposed advantage": females are better off with parthenogenesis than with sexual repro-
duction-they are more likely to have genetically healthy offspring and can pass on more
of their genes at less cost.). I want it to be clear that I do not personally endorse either
proposition-some of my best friends are men. I simply hope to illustrate the true impli-
cations of the sociobiological evidence Epstein, not I, insists we look at. And, if Epstein
can, as he admits, "[P]erhaps... overstat[e some bits of this information] for dramatic
effect", I should be forgiven for doing the same. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 339.
78. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 341.
79. Id. at 341.
80. Woodroffe & Vincent, supra note 73, at 295 (citing the examples of gibbons and
European badgers).
81. The exceptions include certain birds, marmosets and certain other New World
monkeys and social canids. In the latter, food is shared, not simply between mating
couples, but generally among the group, which includes mothers who are provisioned by
subordinate females who themselves forgo breeding. But not even in any of these excep-
tional cases can females or infants rely on males for food. Only among eusocial mammals
such as naked mole rats is there anything even remotely close to a division of labor in
which reproducing females dedicate themselves fully to reproduction because they are
provisioned by others in the group. But if eusocial animals or social canids are Epstein's
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HeinOnline  -- 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 390 1994-1995
No. 2] Radical Feminists
Ozzie and Harriet cannot be found on the primitive savannah.
Rather, the overwhelmingly predominant pattern among non-
human primates and other animals, as well as among human so-
cieties including our own, is what feminists have dubbed the
"double shift" or "second shift", in which the female, in addition
to doing the work of childrearing without significant assistance
from the male, must labor to provide for herself and her chil-
dren.8 2 Anthropologists have shown that this is the pattern
among hunter-gatherer societies, in which women typically pro-
vide 60 to 80 percent of the group's diet. 3 Historians have
shown that the double shift was the pattern among virtually all
classes at virtually all times in Western history.84 And sociologists
have shown that this remains the pattern in other industrialized
countries 5 and in America today, not only among so-called sin-
gle-parent families, but even among so-called nuclear families.8 6
Far from being a human, let alone a biological, universal, the
separate spheres idealized by Epstein are a rare exception found
model, he should favor some form of communitarianism, socialism or the extended fam-
ily, not the nuclear family. For a comprehensive survey of the very limited assistance mam-
mal mothers get, see Woodroffe & Vincent, supra note 73; see also ANNE W. GoLDrzEN,
TAmAmNs AND MARMOsErS: COMMUNAL CARE OF OFFSPRING rN PRAATE SOCIMTES 33-43
(Barbara B. Smuts et al., ed. 1986) (describing cooperative breeding behavior in which
individuals other than the mother are involved as extremely rare among mammals).
82. See generally ARUE HoCHSHIELD, THE SECoND SHWI: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT Hom (1989).
83. See, e.g., Hill Williams, Finding Global Ties that Bind-Witer Discovers Unity in Diverse
World Culture% SFA'nr Tm Es, Jan. 29, 1990, at El. ("[AuthorJohn] Reader was deeply
impressed with the role of women wherever he went. In a hunter-gatherer society in
Africa's Kalahari desert, he learned that 80 percent of the people's diet is vegetable. 'The
men, the hunters, go out after preparing themselves with dances, and there is only a one
in four chance they'll bring something back,' Reader said. 'When women go out, they
bring back food 100 percent of the time.' Pygmy women, speaking through an inter-
preter, told him: 'We only need men for one thing, and that once a year. So we tell them,
sure, go off and kill an elephant.' Reader couldn't help drawing a comparison to the
families he talked to in housing projects in Cleveland where, 'there were no fathers, but
this network of mothers kept things going, taking care of the children.' "); accord Richard
B. Lee, What Hunters Do For a Living, in MAN THE HuNmiT 31, 33 (Richard B. Lee & Irven
DeVore ed. 1968);James Woodburn, An Introduction to Hazda Ecology, in id 49, 51.
84. See generally SmiPnANrE Cooerz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AmmiucAN FAMIuIES AND
THE NOsrALGiA TRAP (1992). An extensive feminist historical literature has documented
that separate spheres were a 19th century middle-class invention more prevalent even
then in theory than practice-lower class women could not afford to specialize in caring
for their children and upper class women did not choose to. In many societies, for exam-
ple, the latter hired the former as wet nurses.
85. See, e.g.,Janice Drakich, In Search of the Better Parent: The Social Construction of Ideolo-
gies of Fatherhood, 3 CAN. J. OF WomEN & L. (1989) 69, 83-85 (citing studies showing that
wives with full time paid employment still spend two to three times as much time on
chlldcare and housework than their husbands do).
86. Sep, e.g., D. BURDEN & B. GOOGINS, BOSTON U~rivssrTY BALANcrNG JoB A N HoME-
uFE STuDy 15 (1987). (Married women in the workforce do twice as much housework as
their husbands.).
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only among a small segment of the population in a narrow geo-
graphic area for a brief moment of human history.8 7
Thus, if Epstein wants to ratify nature, as well as pursue the
libertarian project, then he should endorse Martha Fineman's
view that the appropriate unit for family law and policy is not the
"intact" nuclear family, but mothers and their offspring-he
should seek the abolition of marriage and oppose rights for fa-
thers except as they flow from contractual arrangements made
with mothers. Fineman proposes that the mother-child dyad be
substituted for the married couple as "the core, primal, basic
family affiliation" on which law and policy are based. 8 As to mar-
riage, Fineman says:
[W]e should abolish marriage as a legal category and with it
any privilege based on sexual affiliation.... There would be
no special legal rules governing the relationships between hus-
band and wife... as now exist in family law. Instead, the inter-
actions of male and female sexual affiliates would be governed
by the same rules that regulate other interactions in our soci-
ety-specifically those of contract and property, as well as tort
and criminal law. The illusive equality between adults in sexual
and all other areas would thus be asserted and assumed, a re-
sult which to many will be symbolically appealing. Women and
men would operate outside the confines of marriage, transact-
ing and interacting without the fetters of legalities they did not
voluntarily choose. Of course, people would be free to engage
in "ceremonious" marriage; such an event would have no legal
(enforceable in court) consequences ... [and] no imposed
terms such as now operate in the context of marriage....
One benefit of abolishing marriage as a legal category (on
which a whole system of public and private subsidies and pro-
87. Cf June Carbone & Margaret Brinig, Rethinking Mariage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change and Divorce Reform 65 TuL L. REV. 953 (1991) (noting that Gary Becker is
.using the language of economics to re-invent the separate spheres that were the hall-
mark of the nineteenth century ideal of complementarity").
88. Fn'EMAN, supra note 13, at 228-30. Cf Sherwood L. Washburn, Human Behavior and
the Behavior of Other Animals, in SOCIOBIOLOGY EXAMInED 254, 259-60 (Ashley Montagu,
ed., 1980) ("The idea that sexual attraction is responsible for the existence of the social
group in nonhuman primates and for the family in man is appealing. It is simple and
easily stated, and in our culture, biological explanations are regarded as more scientific
than social ones; but the sexual attraction theory of society does not fit the data -even in
the case of our closest relatives.... The importance of sex as the binding mechanism is an
idea that comes from 19th century European culturejust as the lack-of-estrus-monogamy
theory comes from a simplistic view of our culture. Social organization is the most impor-
tant adaptive mechanism, and sex adds a wide variety of attractive or disruptive behav-
iors."); Rhonda Hillbery, The household issue: Scholars say genetic predisposition doesn't dictate
the form of the family, MntmApos STAR TRm., May 1, 1994, at IA. Gibbons are monoga-
mous, baboons polygynous, chimpanzees promiscuous, but this descibes their sexual ac-
tivity, not the rest of their family life.
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tections are based) is that the state interest in bolstering the
institution would dissolve. Adult, voluntary sexual interactions
would be of no concern to the state since there would no
longer be a state-preferred model of family intimacy to protect
and support. Therefore, all such sexual relationships would
be permitted-nothing prohibited-nothing privileged....
Ending legal marriage would have other diverse beneficial im-
plications. For example, it would remove the justification for
the defense of marriage to a charge of rape; it would render
indefensible the differential treatment of children based on
their parents' marital status; it would obliterate the whole idea
of "marital property".... This proposal.., which I realize may
be viewed as quite radical, is necessary given the ideological
position of the sexual family and its role in maintaining
inequality.8 9
Fineman's proposal would allow Epstein to be true to his insis-
tence that "[t]he basic biological theory is important... because
it gives some broad and useful clues as to the direction that these
[voluntary] interactions [within the family] will take."90 Epstein
made this assertion under the mistaken impression that the "nat-
ural" direction these interactions would take is that of the "tradi-
tional" couple occupying separate spheres. As we see, there is
instead much evidence to suggest that, instead, what some may
think of as a deviant or broken family-that of a single mother
and her children-is even more likely to emerge "naturally."
This basic family unit is defined by, as Fineman puts it, "a vertical
rather than a horizontal tie; a biological rather than a sexual affil-
iation, an inter-generational organization of intimacy."9 For the
very reason set out at length in Epstein's paper, i.e. that inclusive
fitness negates pure altruism but encourages concern for kin, a
mother and children are far more likely to work cooperatively
and productively for mutual interest than would those biological
strangers a husband and wife.92 Epstein must acknowledge, on
the strength of the very biological evidence he himself cites, that
the mother-child dyad is far more likely to guarantee mutual
gains from trade than is the sexual couple. If Epstein was not
merely using biological evidence instrumentally in support of his
unshakeable prior commitment to "traditional" marriage, but is
prepared to follow the evidence wherever it may lead short of
89. Fimeman, supra note 2 at 228-30.
90. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 340.
91. Fimeman, supra note 2, at 6.
92. See Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 333-35.
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force or fraud, he should therefore give the same blessing to sin-
gle mothers he urged us, on the basis of insufficient data, to give
the traditional family. As I understand the scope of that blessing,
now circumscribed by Epstein's renunciation of nature as a
source of norms, it is limited but significant: We are to look to
nature for patterns and trends which, to the extent a biological
cause can plausibly be identified for them, should then be ab-
solved of the accusation that they result from questionable and
distorting societal pressures. Thus, as Epstein asserted that it is
nature, not the patriarchy, that gave us so many traditional fami-
lies, he should similarly now take the view that it is nature, not
our degenerate, promiscuous society, that led to so many house-
holds headed by single mothers. 93
Quite apart from the sociobiological support it may have,
Fineman's proposal should also appeal to Epstein because it is
more true to libertarian norms than is state-sponsored marriage.
That Epstein is far from Fineman's position because, in fact, he
values traditional marriage far more than he does either libertari-
anism or sociobiology is clear from his denial that under his Tak-
ings theory, "the criminal laws against prostitution violate the
eminent domain clause."94 According to Epstein, prostitution's
harmful externalities permitted its prohibition:
In addition I may be sufficiently old-fashioned, but prostitu-
tion seems problematic because many of these men are mar-
ried. They took vows which said 'exclusive unto thee' and now
they're in breach of the marriage contract. The law of induce-
ment of breach of contract is generally a recognition of the
inadequacy of direct remedy against the other contracting
party. Sometimes you have to go after third parties ...
[W]hen you can't get the right wrongdoer it may well be nec-
essary to accept broad restrictive practices.95
The flaws in this chain of reasoning are almost too obvious and
numerous to catalogue. To begin with, not all men are married;
surely if adultery is the harm it would be possible to prohibit only
adulterous prostitution. Moreover, we do not treat marriage, let
93. Cf William D. Murray, Quayle blames L.A. riots on disintegratingfamily unit. UPI, May
19, 1992 (stating that the Vice-President criticizes Murphy Brown for "bearing a child
alone and calling itjust another 'lifestyle' choice"). Of course, Epstein is free to continue
to argue in favor of the traditional family if he wishes. But he should realize that the best
arguments in its favor will not be biological and, indeed, that biological arguments may
cut against him.
94. Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MtAMi L REv. 21, 32 (1986).
95. Richard A. Epstein, Proceedings of the Conference on Takings of Property and the Constitu-
tion, 41 U. MIAu L. REv. 49, 83 (1986).
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alone the vows recited during the marriage ceremony, as an en-
forceable contract; even if we did, we do not specifically enforce,
we do not permit speculative damages; we certainly do not
criminalize inducement to breach, indeed, we often permit
breach. Moreover, we do not allow free contracting over the
terms of the marriage contract; if we did, there are many reasons
to suppose that not all couples would bargain for fidelity. What
the anti-prostitution argument tells us, however, is the strength
of Epstein's commitment to traditional marriage even when it
contradicts libertarian principles 6 as well as sociobiological
evidence,
2. Men are Slime
As his attempt to derive separate spheres from nature shows,
for someone who cites Hobbes so often, Epstein has a remarkably
benign view of nature: it's warm and cuddly, not red in tooth and
claw;9 7 This "upbeat9 8 view leads him astray when he tries to
draw normative implications from sociobiological evidence. For,
in his argument for the traditional family (an argument which, as
I have suggested, the sociobiological evidence does not support)
Epstein draws a bright-line distinction between contractual ar-
rangements "procured by force or fraud" and those induced by
"genuine human needs, born of scarcity."99 As the sociobiologi-
cal evidence makes abundantly clear, this is a false dichotomy.
Epstein grossly underestimates the extent of force and fraud in
96. Cf Frances Olsen, TheMyth of State Intervention in theFamiy, 18 McH.J.L. RfF. 835,
857 & n.57 (1985) ("[C]onsider the laws that forbid prostitution and nullify contracts
when sexual services constitute all or part of the consideration on one side of the agree-
ment. In our present society, the effect of nullifying such contracts usually enriches the
male at the expense of the female.... The anti-prostitution rule also limits the right to
contract, and limits it in a way more likely to hurt women than men. It is one thing to say
that we will not assume that men necessarily get more out of sexual intercourse than
women do, but it is quite another to say that courts may not consider and couples may not
contract about any differential benefit that may accrue. Given the statistics on present
satisfaction with sexual intercourse, I would suggest that this clearly harms women.").
Epstein's analysis is typical of one that prevents women from being free market actors
because it insists, as does the law, that most of the services over which women have market
power (e.g. their sexual and gestational services) must be given away, not sold.
97. Surely we all would like it if "love [were] creation's final law / Tho Nature red in
tooth and claw / with ravine shrieked against his creed," but there should be no confus-
ing the law of love and the law of nature; indeed, as Tennyson reminds us, they are at
odds. Alfred Lord Tennyson, In Memoriam A.H.H.
98. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 348.
99. Id. at 340.
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nature.' More particularly, he overlooks the extent to which
the "genuine human needs" that drive male-female interaction
include male needs satisfied by force and the female need to pro-
tect herself against the exercise of male violence.''
In contrast to Epstein, evolutionary psychologist David Buss,
who also spoke at the Conference about human mating strategies
from a biological perspective, put male violence front and
center. Buss's matrix of "strategic interference", or the costs im-
posed by conflict in sexual strategies, highlighted the 70% of
homicides perpetrated by one male on another and the substan-
tial minority of homicides men perpetrate on women because
they are enraged by real, imagined or threatened sexual infidel-
ity or defection from the relationship on the part of the wo-
man.'0 2 By contrast, according to Buss, female on female
100. He may also go on to overestimate the extent to which the mere existence of civil
society eliminates the threat of force and fraud. If he does do the latter (it's hard to tell,
given how absent force and fraud are from his picture of the natural world) he is, at least
with respect to women, making another serious error. Once again, he would do well to
listen to John Stuart Mill, who said. "[P]eople flatter themselves that the rule of mere
force is ended; that the law of the stronger cannot be the reason of existence of anything
which has remained in full operation down to the present time. However any of our
present institutions may have begun, it can only, they think, have been preserved to this
period of advanced civilization by a well-grounded feeling of its adaptation to human
nature, and conduciveness to the general good. They do not understand the great vitality
and durability of institutions which place right on the side of might ... how slowly these
bad institutions give way ... beginning with those which are least interwoven with the
daily habits of life; and how rarely those who have obtained legal power because they first
had physical, have ever lost their hold of it until the physical power had passed over to the
other side. Such a shifting of physical force not having taken place in the case of women;
this fhct, ... made it certain that this branch of the system of right based on might, would
be the very last to disappear.... [S]o long as it does not proclaim its own origin and
discussion has not brought out its true character, [it] is not felt tojar with modem civiliza-
tion, any more than domestic slavery among the Greeks jarred with their notion of them-
selves as a free people. The truth is, that people of the present and the last two or three
generations have lost all practical sense of the primitive condition of humanity.... Peo-
ple are not aware how entirely, in former ages, the law of superior strength was the rule of
life; how publically and openly it was avowed. History gives a cruel experience of human
nature, in shewing how exactly the regard due the life, possessions, and entire earthly
happiness of any class of persons, was measured by what they had the power of enforcing;
how all who made any resistance to authorities that had arms in their hands had not only
the law of force but all other laws, and all notions of social obligation against them...."
JoHN STaR" MILL, THE SUBJECrION OF WOMEN inJoHN SruART MIL. & HA Eaa TAYLOR
MILL, EsSAYS ON SEx EQUALirY, 131-32 (Alice Rossi, ed., 1970).
101. Let me once again insist that I personally am not here saying that all relations
between men and women are irreparably tainted by force and fraud, but merely that the
sociobiological evidence Epstein, not I, insists we look at may suggest this.
102. See generally, MARrIN DALY & MARGO WnsON, HOMICIDE (1988); Daly, Wilson and
Weghorst, S.J., Male SexualJealousy, 3 ETHOLocy & SoCIOBILOG 11 (1982) (analyzing
murders of women by their husbands and finding the results match Darwinian predic-
tions about males ensuring their female mates' fidelity).
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homicide is quite rare103 and female on male homicide "typically
occurs in defense against a man who is enraged about infidelity
or defection, or after a prolonged history of abuse .... 1" Men
also inflict costs on women of a very different sort than homicide,
sexual aggression, sexual harassment, sexual coercion- ...
these situations typically involve male perpetrators and female
victims."' 05 Additionally, Buss notes, male sexual jealousy is re-
sponsible for devices to control female sexuality ranging from
cloistering to genital mutilation.0 6 The only costs Buss claims
women inflict on men are "sexual exclusion and sexual withhold-
ing", about which he sensibly notes that while "psychologically,
men experience these forms of exclusion as costs... women obvi-
ously have and should have control over whom they want to date,
marry and have sex with."107
The hypothesis that "men are slime", which Buss concedes may
account for all his data, 08 is, like the data on male violence
themselves, noticeably missing from Epstein's account of rela-
tions between the sexes. Male violence and its costs are not, how-
ever, missing from the accounts of sociobiologists. Consider the
following exchange between two of the most eminent propo-
nents of sociobiology, Harvard anthropologist Irven DeVore, the
patriarch of primate sociobiology, and Berkeley biologist Robert
Trivers, whom Epstein cites frequently:
[Trivers for] Omni [Magazine]: Are you still being attacked
by feminists?
103. Buss, supra note 77, at 539. While men kill each other, according to Buss, women
just verbally "derogate" each other, laughing at flaws in another woman's appearance.
Even here, however, his example of such a colorful stream of insults comes, not from the
actual experience of women, but from a fictional account of two women written by a male
author: it's a bit of male fantasy. See id. at 539 n.12 (quotingJOHN BARTH, THE SoT-WaaD
FACrOR (1987) to "illustrat[e] the enormous range of insults hurled by women").
104. Cf Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward FeministJurisprudce 34 STAN. L. REV. 703,
716-17 & n.72 (1982) (ReviewingANNJoNEs, WoMEN WHo KILL) ("[T]he norm of roman-
tic love situates the sexes differently with respect to passionate violence. Perhaps that
norm tends to legitimize women's victimization at the hands of men, at the same time
requiring some sex specific explanation for women who respond in kind. Indeed, it is
this kind of process that creates the social category and problematic of 'women who kill'
in the first place. The process only becomes visible upon inquiring whether men who kill
for similar putative reasons are regarded as acting sex-specifically, as men. The point is
not to develop a gender-neutral explanation for female violence, but to expose the sex-
specificity of male violence.").
105. Buss, supra note 77, at 538. The atypical cases, he notes, involve male perpetrators
and male victims, as in prison rapes.
106. Id. at 539.
107. Id. at 540.
108. Id.
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DeVore: Oh yes, but not so much anymore. At first, our inves-
tigations were largely devoted to analyzing strategies of male
reproduction - male behavior tends to be far more flamboy-
ant and male reproductive success tends to vary more than fe-
males'. Yet my female graduate students knew in their guts
that this could not be the whole story; they began to educate
themselves and me. Together, we worked through the reality
of male-female relations in animal and human societies. Per-
haps I'm proudest of the fact that these bright young women,
confronted with fundamental theory in biology, are able to
reconcile social and feminist concerns with it.
[Trivers for] Omni: Can you give me an example?
DeVore: Male domination of women - as measured by the
grievous statistics on murder, rape, spousal assault, and infant
killing, and myriad lesser costs - is unquestionably a problem
in human society. What has been in doubt is how recent a
phenomenon this might be. Barbara Smuts' review suggests it
is not recent at all. A general pattern of male coercion of fe-
male sexuality exists in many pimates. Male aggression toward
females commonly rises as the females become more sexually
attractive, because dominant males seek to prevent female sex-
ual congress with other males, some of whom may be pre-
ferred by the female. Forced copulations, infanticide,
aggression toward and murder of females occur throughout
pimats but with very different frequencies in different species.
Female vulnerability may depend strongly on the existence or
nonexistence of female kin and/or friends who can provide
support. Gorilla females, for example, live in one-male units
without adult female relatives to help them. The male is twice
their size. They are very vulnerable. If there's no support
available, the female may need to seek protection from a sin-
gle male in exchange for more or less exclusive sexual rights.
This logic, Smuts suggests, is at work in our species. In many
societies, marriage protects a woman from rape by outside
males while legalizing it by the husband. This new work may
force even you biologists to enlarge your understanding of sex-
ual selection.
[Trivers for] Omni: How is that, Irv?
DeVore: You see sexual selection as consisting usually only of
male-male competition and female choice. But Smuts' work
calls attention to male coercion of female sexuality as an evo-
lutionary force. Male coercion limits female choice, but it may
also force costs on females, causing them to pursue a less prof-
itable life than without the coercion. Male sexual coercion
uses the cost, or threat of cost to manipulate the female. If 10
to 30 percent of the offspring in each generation are lost to
male reproductive coercion, we're dealing with a major evolu-
tionary force.
398 [Vol. 18
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A common theme turning up all over the animal world: Fe-
males may be foreced to buy into a degree of domination and
abuse from one male to protect herself [sic] from worse abuse
by others. This may be the fly-in-the-ointment of sexual selec-
tion. In the Eighties, many of us came to imagine a world
where female choice often ruled for female benefit. Male-
male competition would evolve under female control, as I
used to say like a giant tournament designed to reveal to
choosing females the fittest genes for future progeny. Male
coercion takes the system downhill, subverts female choice to
choosing the lesser of two evils, limiting female choice to be-
come an offshoot of male coercion. The only challenge to fe-
male choice as an overriding force for female gain is that male
coercion may force the female into a relatively narrow choice
- which male can best help prevent molestation by others.
10 9
Of course, this awareness of the pervasiveness of male violence
and its interference with female liberty is central to much femi-
nist jurisprudence.'11
Compare, for example, Irv DeVore's discussion of female
monkeys who "give sex exclusively to one male in exchange for
109. The primal dramatist: He sees the script of human evolution vividly played out by the great
apes, OMNI, June 1993 (interview with Harvard anthropologist and sociobiologist Irven
DeVore by Robert L. Trivers, biologist at U.C. Santa Cruz). See alsoJoseph H. Manson,
Primate Pu kas, 2 EVOLUTIONARY ANTHROPOLOGY 109, 111 (reviewing MEREDrH J. SMALL,
FEMALE CHOICES, SExuAL BEHAVIOR OF FEMALE PRIMATEs and KAREN B. STEIN, FACES IN THE
FoREsr. THE ENDANGERE MURIQUL MoNmS OF BRAZIL (1993)) ("Small rightly points
out that the threat of male aggression constrains female sexual behavior and, even in our
own society, limits our ability to collect accurate information about female preferences. A
long history of hominid male sexual coercion is suggested by its high cross-cultural fre-
quency, its taxonomically widespread occurrence in nonhuman primates and, most con-
vincingly, the theoretically derived prediction that paternally investing males.., will take
drastic measures to increase paternity confidence."); BARBARA B. SMUTS, SEX AN FRIEND-
SHIP IN BABOONs, 259, 260 (speculating from observation of baboon mating strategies that
what early human males had to offer females was protection from aggression by other
males, not hunting ability or other economic benefit).
110. See, e.g., Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. Rtv. 441, 455 (1992) (cit-
ing, inter alia, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEmINISM UNMODrS-D. ("[W]omen live within
the constraints of a high risk of sexual violence and a pervasive fear of sexual violence
inhibiting our actions in the public world and coloring our inner lives in private. This
greater vulnerability obviously compromises women's physical security and psychological
well-being in many ways of which I will mention only a few ... Sexual violence and the
fear of sexual violence ... drastically limit our choices and even our perception of our
choices of ways to live. It makes marriage appear much safer and, hence, more desirable
than it is.... More generally, the fear of the potential for sexual violence from husbands,
partners, potential partners, acquaintances, or strangers leaves all women, not just abused
wives and rape victims, considerably more vulnerable, more dependent, and more con-
strained than our brothers, fathers, sons and husbands.")). As has been pointed out often
before, a fear of bad, dangerous male sexuality, needing to be controlled, is also some-
thing Catharine MacKinnon and other radical feminists share with certain kinds of
conservatives.
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protection from other males""1 ' to Robin West's account of the
effect of the fear of male force on human women:
One way that (some) women respond to the pervasive, silent,
unspoken and invisible fear of rape in their lives is by giving
their (sexual) selves to a consensual, protective and monoga-
mous relationship. This is widely denied-but it may be widely
denied because it is so widely presumed. It is, after all, pre-
cisely what we are supposed to do. One woman describes her
embrace of this option thusly: .... 'The threat of men's vio-
lence drove me into couple relationships. I feel ambivalent
about these men. They were not unmitigated bastards and
they did afford me protection.... Being alone I felt, at times,
besieged and up for grabs. Being with one man sheltered un-
welcome attention from men in the streets, at parties, etc.'
Women who give themselves up to a monogamous relation-
ship in order to avoid the danger of rape from others, often
end up giving themselves within the monogamous relationship
so as to avoid the danger of rape by their partner.112
Or compare Birute Galdikas's account of the harassing behav-
ior of subadult male orangutans" 13 with Robin West's account of
adolescent human male sexuality."' The locker-room boys de-
111. De Vore, supra note 109.
112. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Themy, supra note 12. It may be easier to see the problematic nature of the
bargain made with a sexual protector in the all-male prison context, where pairing off
with a powerful inmate protects the weak from rape by others. See WILBERT RIDEAU, THE
SFXUAL JUNGLE in Wn.BE. RIDEAU & RON WIxBERO, LIFE SENTENcEs: RAGE AND SURVIVAL
BEnN BARs, 73, 101 (1992) (quoting prison psychologist as saying, "It does happen
sometimes that although the relationship is established against the will of another, it may
become a relationship which becomes positive, desirable, and the person who is forced
will continue it voluntarily ... But to say that if that happens, the role is accepted as a
natural role in life, has to be taken in the context of the prison, where I would see it as a
healthy kind of compensatory or coping behavior.").
113. Birute M. F. Galdikas, Orangutan Adaptation at Tanjung Puting Reserve: Mating and
Ecology, in THE GREAT APES, 195-233 (D.A. Hamburg & E.R. McCown, ed., 1979) as cited
in ALISON F. RICHARD, PluMATES IN NATURE (1985). ("Subadult males ... follow subadult
females and adult females zealously. Females are less than encouraging of these atten-
tions, and when mating does occur, it is invariably without their full cooperation. Unwill-
ingness is expressed in varying degrees, 'from seemingly token resistance with women
squalling to fierce battles.' ").
114. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives. A Phenomenological Citique of
Feminist Legal Themy, supra note 12. ("Promiscuous Heterosexuality: Fear and Consent
... ."I wonder if it is possible to explain - at all- to men who remember their own sexual
adolescence and initiation as one of continuous rejection from women, that other men -
the ones who scored -got it more often than not by overt intimidation. That they accom-
plished this great triumph by refusing to even see the girl's subjectivity, much less give a
damn for her welfare, by making their profound lack of concern manifest, and then by
exploiting her resulting (fullyjustified) perception of his dangerousness. That non-crimi-
nal locker-room teenage boys are exploitative and frightening; that promiscuous hetero-
sexuality, both adolescent and post-adolescent - our ofttimes cultural protoype of
innocent and mutual pleasure - is often fraught with fear and the threat of violence. Is it
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scribed by West would be far more at home in the jungle than
would the good and faithful provider described by Epstein.-'
They sound, literally as well as figuratively, like apes.
What implications should an acknowledgement of the full ex-
tent to which "natural" interaction between the sexes is tainted
by force and fraud" have for a libertarian sociobiologist's com-
mitments with respect to the laws governing such interaction in
society? On the broad theoretical level, it may incline him to
Robin West's "pure protection theory" of equal protection. For,
as West, MacKinnon and others have pointed out, women are not
yet the beneficiaries of the social contract: unlike Hobbes's
"man", women do not yet, "kno [w] there be laws, and public Of-
ficers, armed, to revenge all injuries shall be done to" them."17
On the contrary, the laws are often worse than neutral, protect-
ing their aggressors, while subjecting women to increased
vulnerability." 8
possible to make non-dangerous men even entertain the possibility that they were/are the
beneficiaries of the violence threatened and acted upon by their more sexually 'success-
ful' teenage peers?"); see also Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Erotiiza-
tion of Domination, 26 NEv ENG. L. Ray. 1309, 1328 (1992). ("This leads to a simple law
and economics hypothesis that increasing protection from sexual abuse should increase
the bargaining power of women vis a vis men, whether or not those men are seen as potentially
abusive both in domestic situations and in the workplace. Reducing protection, on the
other hand, should make women more dependent on men who don't abuse, by making
leaving riskier, and thereby make them more willing to make concessions.").
115. According to evolutionary psychologist Steve Gangestad, "To think that [the tradi-
tional American family] is a natural state or [the] only natural state is a mistake....
There are plenty of arrangements available, [including polygyny, polyandry, matrilineal-
ism and varying degrees of male involvement in the family] "ranging from being closely
involved in caring for children to having almost no role.... One of the only areas where
cross-cultural generalization seems to hold up involves killing and carnage, Gangestad
said. 'Men do more killing, and men are usually the target of killing, too."' Hillbery,
supra note 88, at Al.
116. My focus in this paper will be on force, not fraud, among other reasons because
I've never been convinced the prohibition of fraud can coherently form part of a liberta-
rian agenda. SeeJames M. Child, Can Libertarianism Sustain a Fraud Standard? 104 ETHics
723 (July 1994). Evidence indicates, however, that, like force, fraud is disproportionately
exercised by men. See; e.g., MicRaE. i. GOzrFREDsoN AND TRaWvs HutscHi, A GENERAL
TmoRY OF CRUME 146 (1990) (observing that, although many women are arrested for
fraud, "women are greatly overrepresented in occupations where such offenses are possi-
ble .... When opportunity is controlled, the traditionally higher rate of fraud among
males is again revealed.").
117. THoMAs HOBBES, LEVIA N ch. 13 as quoted in EpsrEm supra note 21.
118. See, eg., Olsen, supra note 96, at 855-56 (A system in which the state created a
"state of nature" within the family "by steadfastly refusing to enforce any tort, contract or
criminal law between members of a family.. would seem to benefit the stronger and
prejudice the weaker members of a family. In fact, though, it might disempower the physi-
cally weak less than the system that seems to operate in some communities - a system that
treats intrafamily battery as private, but leaves homicide fully outlawed. Such a system is
especially disempowering to wives if spouse abuse is not recognized as a defense to homi-
cide.... The particular tort, contract, and criminal laws the state chose to create and
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The pure protection model views the target of the equal pro-
tection clause as the denial of the state's protection to some of
its citizens from private violence, aggression, and wrongdoing.
The goal is a community in which all are equally protected by
the state against a private encroachment of rights. One way to
describe the vision behind this pure protection model of equal
protection, and to a lesser extent behind [Catharine MacKin-
non's] anti-subordination model, is in terms of state sover-
eignty. The pure protection model envisions a world in which
the state is the sole, legitimate repositor of organized force
exercised by some individuals against others.... [Men can-
not] constitute a separate sovereignty over women. Only the
state has the power to exercise dominion, through the use of
organized violence, over its citizens. Any other exercise of vio-
lence and power by one group of citizens over another is crim-
inal, and the state is constitutionally obligated to guard its
citizens against such domination.
119
At minimum, such an approach would, as West notes, require
the abolition of the marital rape exemption. 2 This, it seems, is
the very least a libertarian sociobiologist would endorse. More
generally he should favor reform in the law of rape, which up to
now "has reflected a view of sex and women which celebrates
male aggressiveness and punishes female passivity." 121 Moreover,
enforce would affect the relative power of individuals and thus the bargains they could
negotiate with their spouses.... For example, strong battery laws are likely to help
wives.... Weakened self-defense doctrines limit their ability to protect themselves, and
would seem to protect husbands."); CATHARiNE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIsT THE-
OM( OF THE STATE 193 (1989) ("[M]ale power by men in the family is coextensive with
state power.... [Tihe legal concept of privacy can and has shielded the place of battery,
marital rape, and women's exploited domestic labor. It has preserved the central institu-
tions whereby women are deprived of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition. It
has protected a primary activity through which male supremacy is expressed and en-
forced."). It is this sort of analysis that has led many feminists to speak of the state as
participating in a "male protection racket." See, e.g., Susan Rae Peterson, Coercion and
Rape: The State As a Male Protection Racket, in FEMINISM AD Pit.osonw 360 (Mary Vet-
terling-Bragin et al., ed., 1977).
119. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note
10.
120. See id. at 46-48 for a state by state overview of the continuing extent of the exemp-
tion. It is unclear whether Epstein, who notoriously has to think long and hard before
deciding people should not be allowed to sell themselves into slavery and who seems
untroubled by the non-negotiability of the terms of marriage, would view sexual use on
demand as part of the contract between husbands and wives which, in his view, should be
enforced "even in the face of ex post reluctance or regret" (Two Challenges, supra note 16,
at 340.) and if so whether he would view marital rape as appropriate self-help or specific
performance.
121. Susan Estrich, Rape 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986). Estrich proposes, inter alia, the elim-
ination of the requirement that in addition to non-consent, the prosecution also show
force by the defendant and resistance by the victim. In light of current urban life, as
exemplified by the Bernie Goetz incident and commentary thereon, the analogy between
rape and consensual sex on the one hand and robbery and charitable contribution on the
HeinOnline  -- 18 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 402 1994-1995
Radical Feminists
he should favor new, strengthened seduction laws, to minimize
the extent to which fraud, as well as force, is allowed to contami-
nate bargains between the sexes.122 Beyond this, he may be led
to endorse proposals such as that of Beverly Balos and Mary Lou-
ise Fellows, that "the existence of a prior relationship between
the defendant [in a rape case] and the victim should impose a
heightened duty of care on the defendant to obtain consent by
positive words or actions"123 and that even this would not suffice
when the prior relationship demonstrated a certain pattern of
dominance by the defendant. According to Balos and Fellows:
Although acknowledging male dominance in heterosexual re-
lationships does not lead to the conclusion that all heterosex-
ual sex should be criminalized, it demands that the criminal
law recognize the impossibility of consent in egregious circum-
stances where a man exercises control over a woman through
physical and mental intimidation... If the state shows that the
defendant had a history of physically abusing the victim within
the definitions used for domestic abuse prosecutions, the de-
fense that the victim consented to the sexual contact with posi-
tive words or positive conduct would be unavailable.
124
* More generally, to the extent women's disproportionate vul-
nerability is the result of differences in "size and strength" in ad-
dition to "psychology and behavior", Epstein should favor a
"reasonable woman" standard for a wide variety of criminal and
other should no longer seem so farfetched. If someone you reasonably perceive to be
threatening because of his physical strength and the circumstances asks you for money,
say, on a subway train in a bad neighborhood late at night, and you give it to him, have
you donated to a beggar or capitulated to a thief? Whose state of mind counts and how
must it manifest itself? How different is this situation from one in which a woman submits
without resistance to a demand for sex?
122. "Lying to secure money is unlawful theft by deception or false pretenses, a lesser
crime than robbery, but a crime nonetheless. Yet lying to secure sex is old-fashioned
seduction - not first degree rape, not even third degree rape. A threat to expose sexual
information has long been considered a classic case of extortion, if not robbery itself. But
securing sex itself by means short of a threat of force has, in many jurisdictions been
considered no crime at all. To the argument that it is either impossible or unwise for the
law to regulate sexual 'bargains' short of physical force, the law of extortion stands as a
sharp rebuke. It has long listed prohibited threats in fairly inclusive terms." Id.; see also
Stephen J. Schuhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAw &
PHI. 35 (1992).
123. Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of Trust: Nonstranger Rape,
75 MN. L. REv. 599, 602 (1991). "A prior relationship will no longer be used, as is the
current practice to infer present consent from the fact of previous consent." Id. at 608.
124. Id. at 609 (citing Catharine MacKinnon); see also BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 46.
("[C] oercion as the threat of force.., should be regarded as wrongful even when it leads
to an agreement between the parties because of the tight correspondence between the
victim's losses and the overall social losses of aggressive practices.").
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tort law questions. 12 5 But, though Epstein insists "we act at our
collective peril if we ignore [biological] teaching [about differ-
ences in male and female behavior] in working to fashion ...
social institutions",'12  Epstein himself seems to remember these
supposedly important differences only when challenging femi-
nists. Nowhere in Epstein's Torts Casebook nor in his musings on
human nature and the nature of coercion in his other books nor
in the sources he cites as authority is there any awareness of the
sex differences he insists feminists should remember.127
125. See eg., Estrich, supra note 121 ("[R]ape does not involve 'one person' and 'an-
other person.' It involves, in practice if not everywhere by definition, a male person using
'force' against a female person. The question of whose definition of 'force' should apply
... is therefore critical.... The reality of our existence, and our size, is that less force is
required to overcome most women than most men.... To expect women to resist an
attacker who is likely to be both larger and stronger is to expect them to do what many or
most women have been brought up and conditioned (and if they read some manuals,
instructed) not to do.... [But, according to manyjudges in rape cases] the 'reasonable'
woman ... is not a woman at all. Their version of a reasonable person is one who does not
scare easily, one who does not feel vulnerability, one who is not passive, one who fights
back, not cries. The reasonable woman, it seems, is not a schoolboy 'sissy.' She is a real
man.... ."); MacKinnon, supra note 104, at 717 n.73 ("Feminism tends to... telescopie]
the universal and the individual into the mediate, group-defined, social dimension of
gender. In such a view, a man never attacks a woman as an individual, nor does she ever
respond as such. Nor are the same responses justified for a man as for a woman, at least,
not for the same reasons. The social construction of male and female is inescapable in
individual interactions. The man's acts embody, enforce and rely upon the social power
given men as a group, including the legitimacy given male physical assertiveness and the
availability of men's alternatives. A woman's response is also defined by women's condi-
tioning to containment and is circumscribed by women's social options. To argue self-
defense for women on a feminist basis is simultaneously to attribute necessity and right-
ness, constraint and justice, by construing her response, under the circumstances, as a
sexed act. Feminism mediates the universal - no gender-neutral universal is available be-
cause no gender-neutral universe exists - and the particular - because no individual is
asocial, lacking gender.... To argue that a woman kills 'as a woman' thus has more
specificity than justification theory permits and more generic, group definition than ex-
cuse theory accommodates."). See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the
Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARv. L. Ray. 517 (1993). As my colleague Clay Gil-
lette has suggested, even the law of self-help repossession might profit from a reasonable
woman standard. See Wiliamsv. Ford Motor Credit Co., 674 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1982). Indeed,
if Epstein is serious about enabling women to protect themselves and their property from
male violence, he might consider allowing them to respond with deadly force, not only
against non-deadiy male batterers and rapists, but against thieves.
126. Two Challenges, supra note 16, at 347.
127. See, eg., Espstein supra note 21, Ch. 1; BARGAINING WrI THE STATE, Chapter 4
(1993). That Epstein has not previously adopted a reasonable woman standard is sug-
gested by the fact that, in the latter discussion, while Epstein uses a female victim in his
hypotheticals he makes no mention of sex-specific considerations and indeed, cites only
authorities that speak, without qualification, only of the "reasonable man's" response. See,
e.g., BARGAINIG WTH THE STATE at 46, n.7. See also the failure in FORBIDDEN GRouMs to
suggest that propensity to cooperative and destructive pursuit of self-interest can, in light
of sociobiological evidence, be gendered female and male respectively, discussed supra,
note 26.
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If, however, Epstein were to take the advice he offers feminists,
he might endorse even more radical solutions, such as that of
Golda Meir: 'When a cabinet meeting suggested that the women
stay home after dark, Meir replied, 'But it's the men who are
attacking the women. If there's to be a curfew, let the men stay
home, not the women.' "128 If Meir's proposal seems an over-
reaction, compare it to Epstein's view, supra, that prostitution
should be banned to enforce marital fidelity. When the magni-
tude of the harm and the effectiveness of the remedy in the two
cases are compared, Meir's looks the more plausible of the two
proposals. And if the objection is raised that a curfew for men
only would violate the equal protection clause, consider Epstein's
expansive willingness to endorse differential treatment of men
and women when the risks posed by each sex are different.'1
9
What the combination of Epstein's commitments may thus be
pushing him toward is the MacKinnon domination or anti-sub-
ordination principle-the law should oppose the subordination
of women whether to do so requires treating men and women
the same or differently. The specifics of the law reform proposals
a libertarian sociobiologist might be led to endorse remain to be
worked out, but the general outlines thus seem clear and they
are those of a radical feminist.
III. CONCLUSION
In my own view, if there is any true descriptive lesson from the
behavior of non-human primates and other animals, it is one of
variety.'" This should also be the lesson of libertarianism-al-
128. Letty Pogrebin, Do Women Make Men Irolent? Ms., March 1975, at 55, quoted in
Dianne Herman, TheRape Culture, inWomEN: A FEMINISr PERsPEcnVE 41,43 (Jo Freeman,
ed., 1979) (2d ed.). Herman continued, "Golda Meir's suggestion wouldn't strike us as
odd if we did not assume that women must bear the responsibility for men's sexual ag-
gression." Id.
129. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Common Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation,
72 B.U. L. REy. 699, 725 (1992) ("[T]he failure to draw a distinction in some cases
amounts to an unacceptable burden on one class or the other.... If the risks for men
and women are different, and in [Craigv. Boren] teenage men were ten times more likely
to drive drunk than women, then it is appropriate for a statute to reflect those differ-
ences. If the risk for eighteen-year old men is greater than that for sixteen-year old wo-
men, then the need to control for external harms suggests, if anything, that younger
women should be able to drive when older'men cannot. The conclusion holds, more-
over, no matter what the reason for the sex-linked differences, be they biological or socio-
logical, or, as seems more likely, some combination of the two. The statute is surely
permissible insofar as it cuts off, or at least reduces, an implicit subsidy for men that
might otherwise exist given the differential accident rates.").
130. See, eg., Vicki Croke, Dr. Dolittle, Meet Dr. Ruth: AnimalBeat BosrON GLOBE, March
20, 1993,'at 21 ("Certainly there is an animal out there making it possible for each and
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low, indeed encourage experimentation, so that men and women
can reach their own freely arrived at mutually beneficial deals
and structure their lives as best suits them.
To say that we do not know how women would choose to or-
ganize their lives in a world free of the fear of force and fraud
because we have not yet known such a world is to speak like a
feminist. As Catharine MacKinnon notoriously said, "Take your
foot off our necks, then you will hear in what tongue women
speak."'' Often forgotten is that MacKinnon is here quoting Sa-
rah Grimke, one of the early generation of feminists of whom
Epstein speaks so approvingly. Grimke, as also quoted by Ruth
Bader Ginsburg in her Kahn v. Shevin'3 2 brief, said, "We ask no
favors for our sex. All we ask of our brethren is that they take
their feet off our necks."' 33 What Epstein seems to miss is that
the difference between feminists of an earlier generation and the
more radical ones of the present is not, as the coded language of
the gay rights debate would have it, one of equal rights versus
special rights, of "no favors" versus favors for our sex. Rather, this
generation sees itself as continuing work of which he should ap-
prove-that of freeing women from force and fraud, more fully
removing the foot from the neck.lM The only questions may be
exactly how heavily the foot is seen to weigh and how best to
effect its removal. If Epstein really is committed to the libertarian
every one of us to point and say, 'See, my behavior is perfectly natural.' There are group
sex (frogs and snails), sex changers (snails and oysters), voyeurism (elephants and 'mat-
ing pandemonium'), sensitive guys (baboons) and same-sex pairings (gulls). And mo-
nogamists can take heart, too. We still have the California mouse.... Experts tell us this
species is 100 percent monogamous - they mate for life and split child care right down the
middle."); Sherwood L Washburn, Human Behavior and the Behavior of Other Animals, in
SocaiOLOwv ExAMIN, 254, 260 (Ashley Monatagu, ed., 1980); BARBARA B. SMurs, GEN.
DER, AGGRESSION AND IN LUENCE in PImATE SocmrIEs 400 (Barbara B. Smuts et al., ed.,
1986).
131. MacKinnon, supra note 21, at 45.
132. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (holding that it did not violate the equal protection clause for
Florida to grant a property tax exemption to widows although no corresponding benefit
was offered to Ginsburg's client, a widower)
133. Brief for Appellants Mel Kahn et al. at 16 n.11 (1973), quoting SARAH GiuMlu,
LE.,TERS ON THE EQUALrry OF THE SEXES AND THE CONDrnON OF WOMEN; ADDRESSED TO
MARY PARKER, PRESmENT OF THE BOSrON FEMALE Arn-SLAwa SocE'nr 10 (1838). The
"favors" that Ginsburg rejects are gender classifications that "accor[d] a privileged status
to women" because they are "still regarded as the center of home and family life." These
"favors", such as the exemption of women from jury service, came, Ginsburg said, "at an
exorbitant price." Appellants' Brief at 16.
134. "Indeed, as suggested by the sixties term 'Women's Liberation,' the fact that wo-
men find political participation and economic self-sufficiency a much more illusive goal
than men might be described as the most important finding of the second wave of twenti-
eth century feminism...." Robin West, Ronstruating Liber, 59 TENN. L. REv. 441,455
(1992).
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project, he should be devoting all his efforts to making it possible
rather than insisting that it has already arrived. In other words,
Epstein, as a libertarian and a fan of sociobiology, ought to be a
feminist-he should (at the risk of going counter to his biologi-
cally determined drive to lead rather than follow women) join us
rather than just urge us to join him. We welcome him as we
would welcome all of you.
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